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"Although tax theorists almost unanimously agree that taxa-
tion of wealth should play a larger role in the revenue system,
they have not been successful in convincing Congress."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Joseph Pechman's observation aptly captures the quandary of the
many theorists2 who advocate taxing wealth through the federal trans-
fer tax These scholars make powerful arguments for the tax. They
claim that the tax contributes as much as 30% to the total progressiv-
ity of the entire federal tax system. 4 Furthermore, they argue that the
transfer tax is more equitable5 and more efficient 6 than an income tax.
1 Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 255 (5th ed. 1987).
2 1 use the term "theorists" to refer to theoretically oriented academicians, economists
and lawyers, usually not engaged in private practice. See note 104. The theorist consensus
is probably not as unanimous as Pechman states. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 Yale LJ. 283, 284 (1994) [hereinafter Un-
easy Case] ("[S]cholarly support for some type of transfer tax, although far from universal,
remains strong."); Thomas A. Robinson, The Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes-A Re-
quiem?, 1 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 25,43 (1982) (alluding to the "enthusiastic academic following"
for the transfer tax).
The federal estate tax has strong support among legal academics. See, e.g., George
Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 161 (1977) [hereinafter Voluntary Tax]; Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the
Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 Tax L Rev. 241 (1988) [hereinafter
Redoing]; Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 Yale LJ. 259
(1983) [hereinafter Praise]; Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes
After ERTA, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1183 (1983) [hereinafter Reforming]; Jerome Kurtz & Stanley
S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms,
and a Rebuttal, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1368 (1970); David Westfall, Revitalizing the
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1970). Support among economists
has been strong but declining. See Joel Slemrod, Professional Opinions About Tax Policy:
1994 and 1934, 48 Nat'l Tax J. 121, 133-34 (1995) (describing decline in support by tax
economists of inheritance taxes from 92% in 1934 to 72% in 1994). Many political theo-
rists also support estate taxation. See McCaffery, supra, at 290-92 (summarizing views of
John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman and Robert Nozick).
3 The "transfer tax" refers to the estate, gift and generation skipping taxes collectively.
The estate tax, a tax on transfers occurring at death, was enacted in 1916. Revenue Act of
1916, ch. 463, § 2, 39 Stat. 756, 757. The current gift tax, a tax on lifetime transfers, was
enacted in 1932. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501,47 Stat. 169. Since 1976, these taxes
have applied a single progressive rate schedule to an individual's cumulative transfers.
IRC § 2502. The current tax on generation skipping transfers, IRC § 2601, was enacted in
1986. Tax Ref. Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 100 Stat. 2035, 2717.
4 See, e.g., Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 271-72 (analyzing 1970 and 1972 data): Gutman,
Reforming, note 2, at 1194 (describing results of studies of 1965 and 1970 data); Hearings
on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the House Comm. on Vays and Means, 91st Cong.
3977, 3978 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings] (statement of Jerome Kurtz, former Com-
missioner) (analyzing 1965 data).
5 See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalvin, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. Chi. L. Rev. 417,502-03 (1952) [hereinafter Progressive Taxation] ("[Tjhe case for les-
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These arguments have had little apparent impact on legislation.
Since 1945, the federal transfer tax never has accounted for more than
2.5% of receipts and seldom has applied to more than 3% of the pop-
ulation.7 After neglecting the tax in the 1950's and 1960's, Congress
cut it in the 1970's and 1980's,8 and the first Republican Congress in 30
years has promised further reductions. 9
Some scholars use this legislative track record to argue against the
transfer tax' o and for other means of taxing inherited wealth.1' Tax
sening inequalities in... inheritance is surely stronger than the case for lessening inequali-
ties of income. The windfall aspect of inheritance clearly distinguishes the two cases.").
6 They argue that the tax does not distort the allocation of resources because individuals
discount taxes that will be due upon their death. See Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 280; Gut-
man, Reforming, note 2, at 1188; Westfall, note 2, at 989.
7 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Present Law and Propos-
als Relating to Federal Transfer Tax Consequences of Estate Freezes at 38-39 (Comm.
Print 1990) [hereinafter Proposals].
8 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-54; Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 442,95 Stat. 172,320-21; see also Proposals,
note 7, at 38-39 & tbl. 2 ("The increase in the estate tax exclusion enacted in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 removed a substantial
number of estates from Federal estate taxation."); Cooper, Voluntary Tax, note 2, at 230
("The 1976 reforms ... were enacted only as part of a statutory package that gave away
much more in the form of increased exemptions than it even attempted to take back in anti
avoidance measures.").
The federal experience is not an isolated development. Estate taxes have fared poorly in
other jurisdictions as well. California and Massachusetts have repealed their independent
taxes, leaving only a "pick-up" tax completely creditable against the Federal estate tax.
See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 13301 (West 1996) (prohibiting the imposition of an estate
tax), added by Initiative Measure 1982, Cal. Stat. ch. 1535, § 15. for decedents dying after
1996, Massachusetts has only a "pick-up" tax, equal to the Federal Credit. See IRC § 2A.
A number of foreign countries, including Australia, Canada and Israel have eliminated
estate taxes as well. See Richard M. Bird, Canada's Vanishing Death Taxes, 16 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 133 (1978); Willard H. Pedrick, Oh, to Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and
Gift Duties in Australia, 35 Tax Law. 113 (1981); Jeff Broide, Inheritance No Longer Liable
to Taxation, Jerusalem Post, June 7, 1990, at 8.
9 The Contract with America would have increased the estate tax exemption from
$600,000 to $750,000. See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong.
(Title XII) (1995) [hereinafter Job Creation Act]. A recent flat tax proposal sought to
abolish the transfer tax. See, e.g., Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 2060, S.
1050, 104th Cong. § 106 (1995).
10 See Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1215, 1225 (1985) (arguing for repeal in part because "[p]eople do not like a death
tax"); John E. Donaldson, The Future of fransfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and
Refinement, or Replacement, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 539,542-44 (1993) (arguing that lack
of legislative will prevents transfer tax from reducing concentrations of wealth or increas-
ing progressivity); Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 Tax
Notes 1413, 1414 (Sept. 16, 1991) (arguing for repeal based on political realities); McCaf-
fery, Uneasy Case, note 2, at 327-28 (criticizing transfer tax based in part on political obsta-
cles to meaningful transfer tax reform).
11 See, e.g., Donaldson, note 10, at 557-63 (proposing transferee-centered models for
wealth taxation); Galvin, note 10, at 1418-19 (proposing taxation of capital gains at death
or inclusion of gifts and bequests in income); McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 2, at 350-53
(proposing progressive consumption tax).
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theorists, however, resist integrating this experience into tax theory.12
They fail to use the legislative record to evaluate norms such as
progressivity, equality and efficiency.
This failure stems from the standard theorist account of the legisla-
tive process. Theorists usually divorce policy from politics13 by sepa-
rating the merits of proposals from the means by which they are
adopted.' 4 This divorce impoverishes both policy and politics. It
reduces policy analysis to the scientific' s pursuit for universal 16 and
quantifiable17 truth and politics to the exercise of raw economic
power.' 8 Furthermore, this truncated vision distances tax theory from
the legislative debate. Dismissing that debate as driven by ignorance
12 See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L Rev. 1861, 1933
(1994) [hereinafter Cognitive Theory] ("It has, indeed, been a striking feature of tax policy
scholarship that there have been few if any systematic attempts to bring popular, demo-
cratic input to bear on questions of ideal tax policy and design.").
13 This distinction is by no means limited to tax theorists. It pervades policy analysis
generally. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process 26 (1980) ("When we say
that policies are decided by analysis, we mean that an investigation of the merits of various
possible actions has disclosed reasons for choosing one policy over others. When we say
that politics rather than analysis determines policy, we mean that policy is set by the vari-
ous ways in which people exert control, influence, or power over each other."); see also
Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason 305 (1988) ("The enterprise of
extricating policy from politics assumes that analysis and politics, can be, and are in some
essential way, separate and distinctive activities."); Aaron B. Vildavsky, Speaking Truth to
Power: The Act and Craft of Policy Analysis 120 (1979) (distinguishing between intellec-
tual cognition and social interaction in policymaking).
14 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 66,79-83 (1972) (describing tendency of policy analysis to focus on outcomes without
regard to the procedure that produces those outcomes).
15 See Richard Goode, Lessons from Seven Decades of Income Taxation, in Options for
Tax Reform 13,27 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1984) (describing professional preference for
"formal presentation, preferably with a good deal of mathematics"). Tax policy shares this
trait with economics and policy science. See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Eco-
nomics 5 (1985) ("Their official rules of speaking well, to which economists pay homage in
methodological ruminations and in teachings to the young, declare them to be Scientists in
the modem mode.").
16 See Arjo Klamer, The Textbook Presentation of Economic Discourse, in Economics
as Discourse: Analysis of the Language of Economists 129, 151 (Warren J. Samuels ed.,
1990) ("The conventional picture of science [adopted in economics] ... highlights the
products of scientific research and makes it seem as if they are inscribed in stone expressed
in a universal language (logic).").
17 See Herbert Kiesling, Taxation and Public Goods: A elfare-Economic Critique of
Tax Policy Analysis 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter Public Goods] (describing tax policy focus on
market tradable goods). Again, this reflects economics more generally. See, e.g., McClos-
key, note 15, at 7 (attributing Kelvin's Dictum to economists, "When you cannot express it
in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.").
18 Tax theorists generally blame the failure of taxes on inherited wealth on powerful
groups. See Lester C. Thurow, Generating Inequality. Mechanisms of Distribution in the
U.S. Economy 198 (1975) (attributing low inheritance taxes to political power of the
wealthy); see also note 123.
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and economic self interest,19 theorists remain puzzled by public opin-
ion regarding wealth taxation.20
This Article rejects the sharp division of policy and politics. It urges
theorists to go beyond their narrow categories and take seriously the
public discourse, by which I mean the language used in newspapers
and legislative hearings. Reflecting the perspective of the public at
large,2 ' the public discourse fills critical gaps in theorist accounts and
provides a fertile source for enriching policy analysis. Although domi-
nated by symbols and stories, the public discourse nevertheless con-
veys widespread social values.
This Article falls into two parts. One part demonstrates that the
public discourse describes features of legislation that conventional tax
theorist accounts of policy and politics do not. It does so with a case
study of particular legislation, that governing estate freeze transac-
tions. In that legislation, Congress enacted a theorist proposal, only to
repeal and replace it a few years later. Understanding such reversals
is critical if theorists are to influence future legislation.
The first part also describes the standard theorist view of the legisla-
tive process. Theorists typically understand legislation in terms of pol-
icy analysis and conventional interest group politics. Both
descriptions have their gaps. Tax policy analysis describes the estate
freeze legislation as a pragmatic discussion about how to protect the
tax base from "abuses" but does not explain why Congress addressed
some abuses but not others. The political account popular with tax
theorists describes that legislation as a battle between organized and
unorganized interest groups but does not indicate why power shifted
between groups. Thus, neither tax policy analysis nor conventional
19 See McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, note 12, at 1933 ("[S]ome combination of the
thoughts that the subject matter is too complex; that the people are driven by base and
predictable self-interest, and so need not be consulted directly.. that special interest
group politics, more or less corrupt, dominate the landscape, all combine to block any
richer populist or pragmatic tradition [in tax theory].").
20 See, e.g., Cooper, Voluntary Tax, note 2, at 230 ("It is somewhat puzzling why this
[the estate] tax... should have been so resistant to reform."); Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 285
("The most puzzling obstacle to estate tax revision is that the American people do not
seem to like heavy taxes on bequests."); McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 2, at 357 n.259
(discussing "puzzling persistence of wealth transfer taxation").
21 The conventional views of policy and politics reflect the perspectives of policy special-
ists and political actors. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as Institution, 34 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 19 (1934) (distinguishing between specialists, interested groups and general pub-
lic). These different perspectives are described most carefully in John W, Kingdon, Agen-
das, Alternatives and Public Policies (1984). Kingdon identifies three independent streams
in the legislative process: policies, politics and problems. The policy stream consists of the
reasoned analysis made by communities of specialists. The political stream refers to electo-
ral, partisan or pressure group factors influencing politicians. The problem stream consists
of a value judgment that something should be done about a condition, sometimes triggered
by a powerful symbol. This judgment is mostly a product of the larger culture.
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interest group politics fully explains the product or process of the es-
tate freeze legislation.
The first part concludes by presenting the public discourse. The
public views legislation largely through the lens of popular symbols
and stories. 2 These cultural archetypes give content to abstract ac-
counts of policy and politics. They provide clues as to which abuses
are most troubling and which interests receive legislative attention.
Symbols of balanced budgets, concentrations of wealth and family
businesses shed light upon the abuses addressed and the power shifts
in the battle.
Going beyond the case study, the second part considers the implica-
tions of the public discourse for wealth tax theory. Viewing policy and
politics as largely autonomous, theorists currently regard the symbols
as either independent goals or political forces. Adopting a vision in
which policy analysis feeds into and enriches a larger public discus-
sion, this Article urges that symbols be used as evidence of social pref-
erences currently glossed over in the theorist search for the universal
and quantifiable23 The symbols reflect value systems generally ig-
nored in policy discussion.
The derivation of policy analysis from cultural archetypes requires
translating the public discourse into tax policy analysis, a huge project
that this Article only begins. Such translation allows theorists to iden-
tify new policy goals and to evaluate existing modes of analysis. The
family business symbol, for example, points to the importance of re-
ward and community, norms currently neglected. Serious considera-
tion of these norms would alter tax policy analysis radically.
Moreover, the history of archetypes in legislation casts doubt upon
the relevance of the dominant, "pragmatic" school of tax policy analy-
sis for wealth taxation. Pragmatists have long favored ability to pay
over benefit as the normative baseline of taxation, and generally
equate ability to pay with a comprehensive tax base. The history of
inheritance taxation indicates, however, that the comprehensive tax
base ideal is less persuasive in the taxation of inherited wealth than in
other contexts, and that appeals to ability to pay have diminishing
power. In contrast, benefit analysis reflects deeply held popular
views. Theorists would do well to consider analytical modes that treat
tax payments like consumer purchases.
22Although the public discourse is dominated by popular symbols and stories, it is not
necessarily more emotional or irrational than other discourses. There is substantial evi-
dence that all human cognition develops from simple images. See note 231. Moreover,
symbols and stories play an important role in policy analysis. See note 164.
23 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity:
The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 630 (1973) (describing ten-
dency of policy analysis to overlook complex structures and soft variables).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1996] 293WVEALTH TAX POLICY
TAX LAW REVIEW
II. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN LEGISLATION
A. A Short History of the Estate Freeze Legislation
An estate freeze is a transaction in which a member of an older
generation gives to a member of a younger generation an interest in
property that is likely to appreciate in value (the "growth interest")
while retaining, generally until death, an interest in the property that
is unlikely to appreciate (the "income interest"). The gift tax applies
to the transfer of the growth interest whereas the transfer of the in-
come interest is potentially subject to estate tax.24 The value of the
growth interest generally is determined by subtracting the value of the
income interest from the value of the entire property.25 Because the
value of the income interest seldom appreciates, the transaction
"freezes" the value of property ultimately includable in the gross es-
tate. An estate freeze reduces transfer taxes 26 while allowing the do-
nor to retain a steady income.
Taking advantage of double digit inflation, estate planners perfected
numerous freeze techniques in the late 1970's.27 In the preferred
stock freeze, the donor gave away common stock in a corporation
while retaining preferred stock. In the grantor retained income trust
(GRIT), she gave away a remainder interest in a trust while retaining
a term of years. In a buy-sell agreement, the donor transferred an
option to purchase property while retaining the underlying property.28
All these transactions were designed to avoid § 2036(a), which in-
cludes in the gross estate the full value of property subject to a re-
tained life estate. This inclusion rule does not apply if income and
growth interests are separate properties,29 if the income interest lapses
before death or if the growth interest is sold for its fair value.30 Dur-
24 An income interest that lapses or is sold before death is not included in the gross
estate. See IRC § 2031.
25 This subtraction method was later adopted by regulation. See Reg. § 25.2501-1(a)(1).
26 The freeze reduces the amount subject to transfer taxes for three reasons. First, the
growth interest carries a higher rate of return to compensate for its greater risk. Second,
the freeze subjects the appreciation interest to lower gift tax rates. Third, the freeze poten-
tially transfers wealth free of transfer taxes, either through inaccurate valuation or subse-
quent transfers. See text accompanying notes 105-09.
27 See, e.g., Douglas K. Freeman, Estate Tax Freeze: Tools and Techniques (1985);
Byrle M. Abbin, The Value-Capping Cafeteria-Selecting the Appropriate Freeze Tech-
nique, 15 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan. 20 (1981).
28 Buy-sell agreements typically involved exchanges of reciprocal options. Other freeze
devices included the self-cancelling installment note and private annuity, in which the
transferor sold property pursuant to an obligation terminating upon death. See generally
Freeman, note 27.
29 See Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987) (holding pre-
ferred stock and common stock are separate properties for purposes of § 2036(a)).
30 Section 2036(a) does not apply to "bona fide sales for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth."
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 51:
1996] WEALTH TAX POLICY 295
ing the 1970's and 1980's, theorists in the academy and executive de-
partment proposed taxing estate freezes.3 1 These proposals reached
Congress through its own theorists, the professional committee staff
who draft statutory language and committee reports.3
Congress took no action on these proposals until growing budget
deficits in the late 1980's forced tax increases. Adopting a proposal
first described in a staff pamphlet,3 3 Congress in 1987 extended the
inclusion rule of § 2036(a) by enacting new § 2036(c). 34 The House
committee report analogized the retention of preferred stock to a re-
tained life estate in corporate assets.35 Although the committee re-
ports described only the preferred stock freeze, the unusual statutory
language was not so confined. Section 2036(c) applied when a person
"in effect" transferred property having a "disproportionately large
share" of potential appreciation in an "enterprise" while retaining
31 See 2 Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth:
General Explanation of the Treasury Department Proposals 378-79 (1984) [hereinafter
Treasury I] (proposing to treat the owner of an income interest in property as owning
entire property for transfer tax purposes); Cooper, Voluntary Tax, note 2, at 236-43 (pro-
posing reforms to address estate freezes).
In addition to arguing that ownership of preferred stock was tantamount to a retained
life estate in corporate assets, see Boykin, 53 T.C.M. (CCH), at 345, the Service issued a
revenue ruling containing guidelines for valuing the growth interest in a preferred stock
freeze, see Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170, and private rulings stating that the failure to
exercise retained rights could result in a gift, see Ltr. Rul. 8726005 (Mar. 13, 1987) (finding
gift on the failure to exercise conversion right); Ltr. Rul. 8723007 (Feb. 18, 1987) (finding
gift on the failure to declare noncumulative dividend); Ltr. Rul. 8610011 (Nov. 15, 1985)
(finding gift on the failure to redeem stock).
32 See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and
the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 819, 834-35 (1991) (describing role of
congressional staffs in drafting tax statutes and committee reports).
33 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Description of Possible
Options to Increase Revenues, Prepared for the Comm. on Ways and Means 265-67
(Comm. Print 1987).
3 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L No. 100-203, § 10402, 101
Stat. 1330, 1330-431.
35 See EHR Rep. No. 100-391, at 1043 (1987). The committee report explained that it
was adopting the Service's litigating position. See id. at 1042 (citing Boykin).
The same analogy was drawn in 1976, when Congress codified the government's litigat-
ing position in Byrum v. United States, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), by extending § 2036 to stock
over which the decedent retained voting rights. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, at 588-89
(Comm. Print 1976). That provision was codified as § 2036(b). Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1893, as amended by Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702, 92 Stat. 2763, 2925-39.
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rights in such enterprise.36 Unlike § 2036(a), § 2036(c) applied to
sales between family members, even if made for full value.
3 7
After enactment, it became clear that § 2036(c) had wide reach.
The retained life estate analogy applied well beyond the preferred
stock freeze to other freezes such as the GRIT and buy-sell agree-
ment, and to business transactions as common as a loan, lease or em-
ployment contract. Alarmed at the scope of the section, professional
associations urged repeal.38 One lawyer declared § 2036(c) a Frank-
enstein's monster to be destroyed. 39
In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
("TAMRA"), Congress amended § 2036(c).40 The accompanying
committee report detailed the problems raised by estate freezes.
41
Although exempting most loans, leases and employment contracts
from the section, TAMRA confirmed that § 2036(c) applied beyond
the preferred stock freeze. Congress deliberately extended § 2036(c)
to a GRIT, even if the term interest lapsed before death,42 and sug-
36 See IRC § 2036(c)(1)(A) (1987). Although the House report defined an enterprise as
"a business conducted in any form whether it be through a corporation, partnership or
proprietorship," H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, note 35, at 1044, the Conference Committee re-
port broadened the definition to include "a business or other property which may produce
income or gain," H.R. Rep. No. 100-495, at 996 (Conf. Rep.) (1987), reprinted in 1987.3
C.B. 193, 276.
37 See IRC § 2036(c)(2)(A) (1987) (bona fide sale exception not applicable to transfers
to family members).
38 See Technical Corrections Act of 1988: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 100th Cong. 37 (1988) [hereinafter Technical Correction Hearing] (statement of
Malcolm A. Moore, Pres. of the Am. College of Probate Counsel) (the statute "has virtu-
ally paralyzed what used to be the every-day transfer of property from one generation to
another"); Miscellaneous Tax Bills-1989: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
101st Cong. 158-59 (1989) [hereinafter Miscellaneous Tax Bill Hearing] (Resolution of Am.
Bar Ass'n Aug. 1988) ("[N]ew section 2036(c) of the code is totally flawed .... It is unfair
to place all family transactions, many of which are not done for tax reasons, in jeopardy for
a substantial period of time.").
39 See Richard L. Dees, Section 2036(c): The Monster that Ate Estate Planning and
Installment Sales, Buy-Sells, Options, Employment Contracts and Leases, 66 Taxes 876,
893 (1988).
40 Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3031, 102 Stat. 3342, 3634-40. In addition, the Service offered
guidance. See Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422.
41 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-795, at 422-23 (1988) (describing problems of undervaluation
at time of initial transfer, transfer of wealth through inaction in the exercise of rights and
retention of enjoyment of entire enterprise).
42 The amendments triggered a deemed gift of the value of the appreciation interest
upon the disposition of the retained interest. See IRC § 2036(c)(4)(A) (1988). For these
purposes, the lapse of a retained interest in a GRIT was treated as a disposition of the
retained interest. See IRC § 2036(c)(4)(D)(iv) (1988) (treating termination as a lapse);
H.R. Rep. No. 100-795, note 41, at 420 ("[I]f a person gives away a remainder interest in a
trust the assets of which consist of property capable of producing income or gain while
retaining an income interest for a term of years in the trust, there is a deemed gift with
respect to the property when the term of years lapses.").
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gested that the section usually applied to property subject to buy-sell
agreements.43
Critics were not assuaged. In 1989, business groups44 joined the
fray. They argued that § 2036(c) burdened the family business and
found sympathetic journalists,45 willing sponsors46 and receptive com-
mittees 47 In October, the Senate Finance Committee passed a budget
bill containing numerous tax cuts, including repeal of § 2036(c) 48
This bill was widely criticized. Senator Bradley found its provisions
"troubling. '49 Major newspapers denounced its betrayal of the 1986
Tax Reform Act and the victory of special interestsSO Recoiling from
this criticism, Senate leaders dropped the cuts from the budget bill.5 1
Thereafter, interest group pressure intensified around § 2036(c).52
A task force drawn from the American Bar Association and the
American College of Probate Counsel offered a replacement.5 3 Dan
Rostenkowski, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, re-
43 See IRC § 2036(c)(7)(A)(iii) (1988) (creating safe harbor for agreement to buy or sell
property at fair market value at the time of sale).
44 See Miscellaneous Tax Bill Hearing, note 38, at 32-40, 88-118 (statements of the
Nat'l Retail Hardware Ass'n, the Ass'n Equip. Distribs., the Associated Gen. Contractors
of America, the Ass'n for Advanced Life Underwriting, the Nat'l Ass'n of Life Underwrit-
ers, the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., the Small Bus. Council of America, the Chamber of Com-
merce); To Examine the Impact of Current Tax Laws on Small Business: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Small Bus., 101st Cong. at 16-193 (1989) [hereinafter Small Business
Hearing] (statements of the Nat'l Grocers Ass'n, the Small Bus. Legislative Council, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Nat'l Small Bus. United, the Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.,
the U.S. Small Bus. Ass'n).
45 See, e.g., Inheritance Tax is Choking Successors to Family Finns; Removal of Estate
Tax Freeze Puts Burden on Family Businesses, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1989, § 2, at 2.
46 Several members of Congress introduced bills to repeal § 2036(c). See H.R. 60, 101st
Cong. (1989) (Rep. Archer); S. 659, 101st Cong. (1989) (Sen. Symns); S. 838, 101st Cong.
(1989) (Sen. Heflin); S. 849, 101st Cong. (1989) (Sens. Daschle, Heflin, Boren and Symms).
47 The Senate Finance and Small Business Committees held hearings on § 2036(c). See
Miscellaneous Tax Bill Hearing, note 38; Small Business Hearing, note 44.
48 See H.R. 5835, 101st Cong. (1990); see also Albert B. Crenshaw, Panel Votes New
Tax Breaks, Wash. Post, Oct. 5,1989, at Al [hereinafter Panel]. The bill raised S37.4 billion
in order to achieve a net revenue gain of $9.7 billion.
49 Crenshaw, Panel, note 48 (quoting Senator Bradley).
50 See Editorial, So Much For Tax Reform, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1989, at A30; Editorial,
The Tax Follies Cont'd, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, at A30; Editorial, Start Over On the Tax
Issues, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, pt. 2, at 8.
51 The President and leadership agreed to eliminate the extraneous provisions in ex-
change for a separate vote an the President's capital gains cut proposal. See Tom
Redburn, Senate Seeks to Delay Vote on Capital Gains; Would Strip Tax Cut From Defi-
cit-Reduction Bill: Action Could Aid Passage, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, pt. 1, at 21.
52 See Albert B. Crenshaw, Tackling the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Going After the
"Estate Freeze," Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1990, at F6 [hereinafter Tackling) (describing growing
momentum for repeal, 200 co-sponsors for Archer bill).
5 See "Discussion Draft" Relating to Estate Valuation Freezes: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 77-81 (1990) [hereinafter Discussion Draft
Hearing].
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leased a staff Discussion Drafts that replaced § 2036(c) with rules af-
fecting the taxation of the gift of the growth interest. After public
hearings55 and further revisions,5 6 Congress, in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990,5 7 repealed § 2036(c) and enacted in its
stead new Chapter 14.
Chapter 14 created special valuation rules. In valuing gifts of inter-
ests in corporations, partnerships or trusts, it valued at zero certain
rights retained by the donor.58 Furthermore, it valued property with-
out regard to options to purchase the property or restrictions on the
right to sell or use such property.5 9 Finally, it contained special rules
governing lapsing rights or restrictions.60
Chapter 14 was more lenient than § 2036(c) in two respects. First, it
largely replaced estate tax inclusion with rules increasing the value of
the gift of the income interest. The rules governing preferred stock
freezes and GRITs applied for gift tax purposes only. By disregarding
many retained rights in corporations and trusts, Chapter 14 resulted in
a gift equal to the value of the entire property.6' Only a few rules,
principally those governing buy-sell agreements, affected estate tax li-
ability.62 Second, Chapter 14 applied to limited, specified transac-
tions. It applied only to preferred stock transactions, GRITs, buy-sell
agreements and transactions utilizing lapsing rights.63 It had no appli-
cation to loans, leases or employment agreements.
In addition, Chapter 14 created a hierarchy among freeze transac-
tions. Rights in trusts received the harshest treatment. Chapter 14
valued a retained interest in a trust at zero unless denominated as a
fixed amount or percentage of trust assets.64 Failure to pay as pre-
scribed resulted in an immediate gift under generally applicable rules.
Rights in corporations received more favorable treatment. Here,
Chapter 14 accommodated one common arm's length transaction:
Cumulative preferred rights to distributions usually were accorded
54 See "Discussion Draft" Relating to Estate Freezes: House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 101st Cong. (1990). The accompanying press release noted that the Draft was not
"reviewed by any member of the Ways and Means committee."
55 See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53; Estate Freezes: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Energy and Agricultural Tax'n and the Subcomm. on Tax'n and Debt Manage-
ment of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong. (1990).
56 See H.R. 5425, 101st Cong. (1990); S. 3113, 101st Cong. (1990).
57 Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11601, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-490.
58 See IRC §§ 2701, 2702.
59 See IRC § 2703.
60 See IRC § 2704.
61 This is because, under the subtraction method, the value of the gift would not be
reduced by the value of the retained income interest.
62 See, e.g., IRC § 2703(a).
63 See IRC §§ 2701-2704.
64 See IRC § 2702(a)(2).
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value even though not fixed as to amount,65 and failure to make such
distributions as predicted resulted in a taxable gift only after four
years.66 Finally, rights created by buy-sell agreements received the
most lenient treatment. Chapter 14 respected these rights if compara-
ble to those found in arm's length transactions.67
B. Abstract Discourses of Tax Legislation
The estate freeze legislation followed a pattern common in transfer
tax legislation of the last 20 years. Congress adopted a theorist reform
only to reverse itself several years later.68 If theorists are to make
meaningful legislative contributions, they must learn from such
reversals.
Standard theorist accounts make such learning difficult. Tax theo-
rists commonly describe legislation with one of two abstract dis-
courses. One is policy analysis, the language used to evaluate tax
proposals. The other is interest group politics, the language used to
describe power. As the estate freeze legislation demonstrates, both
perspectives leave substantial gaps.
1. Tax Policy Analysis
a. Conflicting Goals
Tax policy analysis, like all policy analysis, involves choosing a goal
and then selecting the best means for achieving it.69 Tax policy ana-
65 See IRC § 2701(a)(3)(B).
6 See IRC § 2701(d)(2)(C).
67 See IRC § 2703(b)(3).
68 This was the fate of carryover basis and the generation skipping transfer tax, both
enacted in 1976. Compare Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 2005-06, 90
Stat. 1520, 1872-79 (enacting carryover basis and generation skipping transfer tax), with
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299-301
(repealing carryover basis), and Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1431-33,
100 Stat. 2085, 2717-32 (repealing and replacing generation skipping transfer tax).
69 See, e.g., Garry D. Brewer & Peter deLeon, The Foundations of Policy Analysis 33,
83, 179 (1983) (recognition of problem, identification of problem context, determination of
goals and objectives, and generation of alternatives, estimation of alternatives and selec-
tion); Melvin J. Dubnick & Barbara Bardes, Thinking About Public Policy. A Problem-
Solving Approach 168 (1983) (defining problem, analyzing problem, establishing the goal,
developing different solutions, analyzing alternatives, choosing best alternative and evalu-
ating selected alternative); E.S. Quade & Grace M. Carter, Analysis for Public Decisions
46-48 (3d & rev. ed. 1989) (decision maker should consider objectives of decision, alterna-
tive available for attaining objectives, impact of alternatives, criteria for ranking alterna-
tives and model for predicting the consequences of the alternatives); Edith Stokey &
Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis 5-6 (1978) (establishing context, laying
out alternatives, predicting consequences, valuing outcomes and making a choice); Stone,
note 13, at 185 (goal determination, canvassing of available alternatives evaluation of alter-
natives and selection of alternative most likely to reach goal).
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lysts acknowledge at least a half dozen different goals or criteria.70
Perhaps the most obvious relate to the use of the proceeds. The reve-
nue norm focuses on the amount of funds raised or lost by a tax pro-
posal. The benefit criterion examines what the taxpayer receives in
exchange for her taxes.71 Fairness and economic efficiency, deter-
mined independently from expenditure, command the most attention
among theorists. Analysts frequently distinguish horizontal equity,
the comparison of those in the same economic class, from the more
controversial vertical equity, the comparison of those in different
classes.72 The traditional argument for redistribution among classes
rests on the diminishing marginal utility of money: Each additional
dollar brings less enjoyment than the last.73
For analysts, efficiency refers to the effect of taxation on aggregate
wealth. Efficiency analysis has both macroeconomic and
microeconomic dimensions. It can consider how taxation affects the
national economy and how specific tax proposals affect individual
decisionmaking. Efficiency analyses of the estate tax consider its ef-
fects on savings74 and entrepreneurial innovation.75
Revenue, benefit, efficiency and fairness by no means exhaust the
relevant criteria. Administrability and taxpayer comprehension also
play a role. In discussing administrability, theorists consider liquidity
and valuation, whether the amount of tax can be ascertained readily
and whether the taxpayer has funds available to pay the tax. In con-
70 See generally William A. Klein & Joseph Bankman, Federal Income Taxation 19-24
(10th ed. 1994); John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax
27-32 (1985) [hereinafter Politics]; Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax
Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567 (1965). The criteria are often referred to as fairness, efficiency
and simplicity. See, e.g., 2 Treasury I, note 31, 386-87.
71 See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 31 ("[J]ust as with individuals, groups.., must
have funds with which to operate, and so it is incumbent on each member to faithfully pay
membership fees, or dues. In return for this payment, the individual gets to enjoy any
benefits conferred by membership in the group.").
72 See, e.g., William A. Klein, Policy Analysis of the Federal Income Tax: Text and
Readings 7-8 (1976) (describing horizontal equity as assuming no redistributional goal);
Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 44, 45 & n.2
(1968) [hereinafter Defense] (contrasting horizontal equity with the "more controversial
problem of vertical equity").
73 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Deborah A. Geier, Federal
Income Tax: Doctrine, Structure and Policy, 206-09 (1995) (describing how declining mar-
ginal utility of money justifies progressivity).
74 See generally Carl S. Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 86-95 (1966) (discussion
of effect of estate tax on saving and investment); Michael J. Boskin, An Economist's Per-
spective on Estate Taxation, in Death, Taxes and Family Property: Essays and American
Assembly Report 56-66 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) [hereinafter Death, Taxes and
Family Property]; Franco Modigliani, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cy-
cle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, J. Econ. Persps., Spring 1988, at 15-39.
75 See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, David Joufaian & Harvey S. Rosen, Entrepreneurial
Decisions and Liquidity Constraints (NBER Working Paper No. 4526, 1993).
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sidering taxpayer comprehension, analysts ask whether the tax is per-
ceived as familiar, certain and simple.76
These goals have their shortcomings. For one, they often conflict.
Equity often clashes with benefit and efficiency 77 By definition, a tax
that redistributes wealth benefits those who do not pay the tax. Like-
wise, a tax that decreases inequalities in wealth may create inefficien-
cies by reducing incentives to work and save.78 Moreover, the norms
raise intractable empirical issues. Benefit can be measured by either
the value received, or the cost of services rendered, both of which are
difficult to ascertain. Efficiency effects cannot be determined without
knowledge of relative elasticities.79 Evaluating fairness claims re-
quires making difficult interpersonal comparisons of utility.80
b. Pragmatic Reconciliation
The conflict and imprecision of tax policy normss lead to consider-
able disagreement.8s To reach consensus, tax theorists invariably nar-
row their focus.83 For the last 50 years, scholars such as Henry
Simons, Richard Musgrave and Stanley Surrey have reconciled tax
policy goals through a specific, "neutral" mode of analysis that mini-
mizes normative and empirical controversy in order to make specific
76 See, e.g., Witte, Politics, note 70, at 31 ("[Cqomplexity, and the public's perception of
that complexity, may affect the legitimacy of the tax system.").
77 See id. at 31-32.
78 See Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency. The Big Tradeoff 88-120 (1975)
(describing taxation as an area in which society is obligated to trade off between efficiency
and equality). At the extreme, most theorists conclude that taxing only the wealthy incurs
unacceptable efficiency losses. See, e.g., Kiesling, note 17, at 47-54; Witte, Politics, note
70, at 35-36.
79 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic of Taxation: Federal Income Tax Theory and
Policy 288 (1989) [hereinafter Logic] ("Whether the quantity of an item is affected by a tax
depends principally upon the elasticity of demand and supply."); Witte, Politics, note 70, at
41 (noting that optimal tax rates are "extremely sensitive to assumptions concerning the
elasticity of substitution of labor for leisure, capital accumulation, and other factors" and
that empirical knowledge of these factors is lacking).
80 See Klein, note 72, at 5-8 (noting the need for personalized judgments in determining
a perfect measure of ability to pay); Witte, Politics, note 70, at 56 (arguing that differences
in individual circumstance cannot be intellectually ranked).
81 See Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory. A Pragmatic
Alternative, 31 Viii. L. Rev. 1665, 1666-77 (1986) (criticizing tax policy criteria as conflict-
ing and lacking an agreed meaning).
s2 Dodge et aL, note 73, at 25-26 ("Because [the] norms and criteria [used in tax policy
analysis] are imprecise, subjective, sometimes conflicting, and sometimes difficult to imple-
ment in the real world, tax policy analysis is an inexact science leading to much
disagreement.").
83 See, e.g., Witte, Politics, note 70, at 32 (noting that "range and inconsistency of val-
ues" cause policymakers to proceed incrementally from a few norms); Sneed, note 70, at
599-604 (creating hierarchy among tax policy norms).
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policy recommendations. 84 In this Article, I refer to this mode of
analysis as "pragmatism. ' s5 Although early pragmatists focused on
the income tax, their successors extended that analysis to the transfer
tax as well.
86
Pragmatists adopt two assumptions designed to sidestep controver-
sial issues. The first makes ability to pay the normative baseline for
taxation.87 This assumption allows pragmatists to refrain from dis-
cussing revenue88 and benefit,8 9 which they regard as too indetermi-
nate for reform.90
Adherence to ability to pay raises the difficult trade off between
equity and efficiency. Pragmatists acknowledge this trade-off in dis-
cussing tax rates.91 Here, they frankly defend progressivity but con-
cede troubling efficiency losses. Professors Blum and Kalvin describe
the case for progressivity as "uneasy," 92 and Professor Simons bases
his case ultimately on an "aesthetic" preference. 93 Likewise,
84 See generally Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (1938); Stanley S. Surrey
& Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 4 (1985); Musgrave, Defense, note 72; see also
George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax
Avoidance, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 657, 660-62 (1985) (describing three waves of attempts by
scholars to establish relatively neutral principals that could serve as a guide for tax reform).
85 Stephen G. Utz, Tax Policy: An Introduction and Survey of the Principal Debates
12-14 (1993) (describing scholars who strive to influence the details of governmental tax
policy). The pragmatism described here is unrelated to the American philosophic move-
ment associated with William James.
86 Professors Simons and Musgrave gave little attention to inheritance taxation. See
H.J. Kiesling, Henry Simons, Equality, and the Personal Income Tax, 34 Nat'l Tax. J. 257,
257-58 (1981); Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance 175-76 (1959). Later
writers, such as Professors Surrey, Graetz, Gutman and Dodge deliberately have applied
the pragmatic assumptions to the estate tax. See text accompanying notes 94-98.
87 See Utz, note 85, at 41 ("[T]he approach that claims the largest following among
prominent tax policy experts is one that made welfare the central issue. It requires that
taxes be levied in accordance with taxable capacity or 'ability to pay."'). Although he
flirted with benefit theories, Professor Musgrave finally adopted ability to pay, observing
that, in any event, a benefit approach would have to be supplemented by one that rectified
distribution. See Musgrave, Defense, note 72, at 46 n.3. Professor Simons espoused a
comprehensive tax base without the intermediate assumption of ability to pay. See
Simons, note 84, at 15 (criticism of factor theories).
88 See Klein, note 72, at 112 ("Adequacy [of revenue] is not a pertinent criterion in the
kind of tax policy analysis with which tax reformers are concerned, where the choice is
among competing provisions or systems and where, consequently, aggregate revenue and
expenditure must be held constant.").
89 Professor Simons discussed benefit only with respect to a few minor levies like the
gasoline tax. See Simons, note 84, at 31-40; see also Klein, note 72, at 2 (half-page discus-
sion of benefit principle as applied to tolls and gas taxes).
90 See, e.g., Dodge, Logic, note 79, at 90-91 (concluding benefit principle lacks a "suffi-
cient degree of specificity" for reform).
91 See, e.g., id. at 301-12 (discussing efficiency concerns with respect to rates); Klein,
note 72, at 32-35 (efficiency considerations discussed as part of progression).
92 Blum & Kalvin, Progressive Taxation, note 5, at 519.
93 Simons, note 84, at 18-19 ("The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested
on the case against inequality-on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing
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pragmatists find that progressivity constitutes the strongest argument
for the estate tax,94 outweighing any efficiency losses.95
Pragmatists, however, do not discuss the trade off between equity
and efficiency with respect to the tax base. Here, they limit contro-
versy with a second assumption: The tax base should be comprehen-
sive. They define a comprehensive tax base algebraically as
consumption plus change in wealth96 for the income tax, and wealth
for the transfer tax. They interpret that base as treating all income the
same, whatever its source, and all transfers alike, notwithstanding
their nature, form or time.97
Pragmatists argue that a comprehensive tax base is a point of agree-
ment that furthers both efficiency and equity.98 They assert that this
base places economic decisions on equal footing.99 Equating ability to
pay with objective well-being,100 pragmatists find that a broad base
promotes fairness. 01
Although formulated by scholars, the comprehensive tax base ideal
molds professional understanding outside the academy. For at least
distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (andlor kind) of inequality which is
distinctly evil or unlovely.").
94 See, e.g., Kurtz Statement, note 4, at 3978 (stating estate and gift taxes are "an essen-
tial ingredient of the progressive element of our tax system"); Graetz, Praise, note 2, at
273-74 ("The principal reason... to revise the estate tax is to rescue this mechanism for
achieving progressivity."); Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1193-94 (noting that the most
persuasive defenses of transfer tax focus on its contribution to progressivity).
95 See, e.g., Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 278-83.
96 See, e.g., Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in
The Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921). reprinted in Am. Econ. Ass'n,
Readings in the Economics of Taxation 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds.,
1959); Musgrave, Defense, note 72, at 47-49; Simons, note 84, at 50 (1938). Professor Sur-
rey's determination of a normative tax system is derived from the Haig-Simons definition.
Surrey & McDaniel, note 84, at 4.
97 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The Estate Tax-Whither or Wither?, in The Promise of
Tax Reform 165 (1985) [hereinafter Estate Tax] ("The more specific goal of estate and gift
taxation must be the elimination of large differences in tax liability based on the nature,
form, or time of the transfer."); Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1217-18 ("Applying these
policy goals to a wealth transfer tax requires the formulation of a principle ... that defines
the tax base uniformly without regard to the nature of the property transferred, the time of
the transfer, or the form of the transfer."); Kurtz & Surrey, note 2, at 1368 (noting equity
requires that "aggregate wealth transfers of equal size should bear equal amounts of
taxes").
98 See Kurtz Statement, note 4, at 3908 ("Fairness and equity demand that [estate and
gift taxes] be apportioned so that equal amounts of wealth bear equal amounts of taxes
regardless of the technicalities of dispositive arrangements."); Dodge, Redoing, note 2, at
252-53 ("Whether one is liberal or conservative.... a broad based low rate version [of the
wealth transfer tax system] is better than a narrow based high rate version .... ").
99 See Dodge, Logic, note 79, at 288 (stating neutrality favors comprehensive tax base);
Musgrave, Defense, note 72 at 48 n.8 (arguing comprehensive tax base furthers neutrality).
100 See, e.g., Dodge, Logic, note 79, at 97 (recognizing ability to pay as the ultimate
norm); Klein, note 72 at 72 (treating income as a proxy for ability to pay).
101 See, e.g., Dodge, Logic, note 79, at 86; Klein, note 72, at 7.
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30 years, the Treasury Department has used a comprehensive tax base
to formulate a tax expenditure budget' o and tax reform proposals.103
Attention to that base also underlies much private tax planning.
Although practicing lawyers, accountants and financial planners sel-
dom advocate base broadening, they carefully attend to the ways in
which current law falls short of the ideal. They reduce clients' taxes
by exploiting rules that differentiate among sources of income or the
nature, form or time of a wealth transfer. Thus, in the legislative
arena, pragmatism pits theorists, in and out of the government, against
tax planners in a battle over "loopholes."104
c. Understanding of the Estate Freeze Legislation: Protecting a
Comprehensive Tax Base Against Abuses
Tax policy analysis views the estate freeze legislation as a rational
discussion over how to approximate a comprehensive transfer tax
base, that is, wealth. Theorists in the academy and government ar-
gued with estate planners over presumed behavior, finally agreeing to
address a few abuses. This discussion underlay much of Chapter 14.
i. Tax Policy Analysis of the Estate Freeze Legislation
In debating estate freeze legislation, theorists and estate planners
both made arguments premised on taxpayer behavior. Theorists iden-
tified several potential taxpayer abuses.'0 5 They first asserted that the
102 Under Surrey's tenure as undersecretary, Treasury published the first tax expendi-
ture budget in 1968. See Surrey & McDaniel, note 84, at 1.
103 See generally 2 Treasury I, note 31; Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform Studies and Propos-
als (1969). Professors Surrey and McDaniel understood the tax expenditure budget as a
"hit list" of tax reform proposals. Surrey & McDaniel, note 84, at 87 (concluding that
"many tax expenditure incentives or corresponding direct programs may have little
justification").
104 See generally Byrle M. Abbin, Taxing Appreciation Hits Everything Up Front: Re-
tirement Benefits, Deferred Compensation and . ., 58 Tax Notes 1659, 1660 (Mar. 22,
1993) (describing "strong disagreement between practitioners who deal with clients in their
'real world,' and the more theoretically oriented academicians, tax policy economists, and
attorneys").
An example of the debate between theorists and estate planners, is the exchange be-
tween then Professor Gutman and members of the ABA Tax Section. See ABA Sec. of
Tax'n Report of Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 Tax Law. 395 (1988); Harry
L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Thx
Restructuring, 41 Tax Law. 653 (1988) [hereinafter Comment]; Ronald D. Aucutt, Further
Observations on Transfer Tax Restructuring: A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 Tax Law. 343
(1989); Harry L. Gutman, A Practitioner's Perspective in Perspective: A Reply to Mr.
Aucutt, 42 Tax Law. 351 (1989).
105 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 100-795, note 41, at 422-23 (describing problems of under-
valuation at the time of the initial transfer, transfer of wealth through inaction in the exer-
cise of rights and retention of enjoyment of the entire enterprise).
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donor might value the gift inaccurately, thereby reducing the total
value subject to transfer tax.106 Next, they claimed that the donor
would make later, difficult to detect transfers, either through subse-
quent failures to exercise retained rights in an arm's length manner,107
or through performance of uncompensated services and diversion of
business opportunities.10 Finally, theorists argued that the donor
would retain control over the entire property. In that situation, the
freeze converts a testamentary bequest into a lifetime gift, effectively
subject to lower rates. 109 By deferring taxation of the entire property
until death, former § 2036(c) met these concerns. It reduced the op-
portunity for inaccurate valuations, assured taxation of subsequent
transfers and applied estate tax rates.
Estate planners countered that the donee might add value to the
frozen entity after the gift. Inclusion of such value overtaxed the de-
106 In a preferred stock freeze, for example, the taxpayer might assume low interest
rates at the time of the gift, reducing the value of the common stock, and high interest rates
at death, reducing the value of the preferred interest. In a GRIT, the taxpayer could trans-
fer property with greater appreciation than that assumed under the Service's tables. Fi-
nally, in the buy-sell agreement, a taxpayer might value equally mutual rights to purchase
property for a fixed price upon death, notwithstanding differing life expectancies of the
holders of the rights.
107 Failure to exercise a put, call or liquidation to a fixed amount effectively enriches the
person with use of the funds. See William F. Nelson & Peter J. Genz, New Uncertainties in
the Equity Freeze: The Impact of Dickman on Capital Call Rights and Other Issues, 63
Taxes 999,1005-09 (1985). Failure to pay preferred dividends as assumed at the time of the
freeze enriches the common shareholders. See id. at 1009-10. Failure to revise the
purchase price in a buy-sell agreement may have the same effect. See generally id. at 1004.
108 Academics explicitly defended § 2036(c) as a means of taxing wealth attributable to
services or control exercised by the decedent. See Joseph M. Dodge, Rethinking Section
2036(c), 49 Tax Notes 199,206 (Oct. 8, 1990) [hereinafter Rethinking] (discussing problem
of transferring wealth through performance of uncompensated services); Gutman, Com-
ment, note 104, at 672-73. Although not mentioned in the legislative history, this concern
was implicit in one of the safe harbors. See IRC § 2036(c)(7)(D)(ii)(II) (1988) (safe har-
bor for qualified start-up debt conditioned on no transfer of goodwill or "customers or
business opportunities").
109 Although the estate and gift taxes share a unified rate schedule, see IRC §§ 2001,
2502, gifts are subject to a lower effective tax rate. One reason is that the estate tax base
includes the amount of the tax whereas the gift tax base does not. For example, a 50%
estate tax on a $100 bequest results in a $50 tax and S50 passing to the heir. In contrast, a
50% gift tax on a person with a $100 results in a $33.33 tax and S66.67 passing to the heirs.
Other features favoring lifetime gifts are the time value of the rate brackets and unified
credit, and the $10,000 per donee annual gift tax exclusion, see IRC § 2503(c). See gener-
ally Gutman, Comment, note 104, at 656-60. The exclusion of subsequent appreciation
from the gift tax base itself is not favorable because the gift tax is paid earlier. See Alvin
C. Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes, 39 Natl Tax J. 499, 499 (1987), stating that:
The present value to a taxpayer of a consistently defined tax wvill be the same
whether the tax is deferred or accelerated, as long as the tax rate remains con-
stant and the base of a deferred tax increases over time by the rate of return
generally applicable to investment of proceeds available after payment of an
accelerated tax.
(emphasis deleted).
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cedent. 110 Therefore, planners rejected an inclusion rule and dis-
missed concerns based on transfers of services and business
opportunities."'
Estate planner concession of theorist concerns formed the nucleus
of Chapter 14. First, estate planners conceded the need to address
inaccurate valuation. 1 2 Chapter 14 addressed this abuse with several
rules designed to promote accurate valuation. One increased the in-
formation available for audit by requiring full disclosure of the facts of
a freeze transaction to commence the gift tax statute of limitations.113
Another approximated likely value by presuming that common stock
was worth at least 10% of total corporate equity.114 A third reduced
the opportunity for undervaluation by valuing at zero retained income
interests not fixed as to amount or percentage. 15
Later, estate planners conceded concerns about the failure to exer-
cise retained rights.116 Chapter 14 addressed this abuse with other
rules aimed at the initial gift. Retained rights that facilitated hard to
detect transfers-discretionary put, call and liquidation rights-were
valued on the assumption that they would be so used.117 Failure to
pay dividends on cumulative preferred stock as predicted resulted in a
transfer tax inclusion.118
Planners never admitted abuses relating to transfers of uncompen-
sated services and business opportunities or to differences between
gift and estate taxes. Consequently, Chapter 14 barely touched these
problems. Neither the statute nor the legislative history alluded to
110 See, e.g., Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 117 (statement of Arthur S. Hoffman,
Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants).
III Estate planners took the position that nonproperty transfers lay outside the transfer
tax system. See, e.g., Aucutt, note 104, at 348-50. They noted that services and business
opportunities could be transferred without a frozen entity. See, e.g., Miscellaneous Tax
Bill Hearing, note 38, at 92 (letter of Richard L. Dees to Sen. Daschle).
112 In 1988, a task force of the American College of Probate Counsel proposed a substi-
tute for § 2036(c) that would treat a gift as incomplete if undervalued by more than 25%.
See Moore Statement, note 38, at 101; see also Dees Letter, note 111, at 93-94 (proposing
disclosure regime).
113 See IRC § 6501(c)(9).
114 See IRC § 2701(a)(4).
115 See IRC § 2702(a)(2).
116 After 1988, two groups offered rules designed to address the failure to exercise
rights. The Section 2036(c) Task Force, drawn from the American Bar Association and
American College of Probate Counsel, proposed a presumption that "discretionary liqui-
dation, conversion, dividend or put rights" would not be exercised in a manner adverse to
the interest of a family member. See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 78-79. Later
that year, the District of Columbia Bar Association issued a report recommending that
property transferred to a family member be valued as if it were held in conjunction with
property retained by the transferor. See id. at 202-11 (statement of Donald C. Lubick,
Chair, Tax Policy Comm., Tax Sec., D.C. Bar Ass'n).
117 See IRC § 2701(c)(2)(A).
118 See IRC § 2701(d).
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them. The statute sparingly applied an inclusion rule to rare situa-
tions: buy-sell agreements not made on arm's length termsn1 9 and
partnership agreements with lapsing rights or restrictions on
liquidation.120
ii. Gaps in Tax Policy Analysis
Tax policy analysis provides an incomplete account of the estate
freeze legislation. For one, it does not account for the give and take of
the legislative process. Policy analysis first selects ends and later
weighs the means for achieving them. In the estate freeze legislation,
however, ends and means were discussed together. Theorists contin-
ued analyzing the problems posed by estate freezes after § 2036(c)
was enacted. Planner concessions increased as efforts at repeal with-
out replacement failed. Clearly, the legislation involved more than
policy analysis.
Furthermore, policy analysis does not account fully for substantive
decisions reached in the legislation. This analysis ultimately does not
explain the decision to replace estate inclusion with rules increasing
the gift tax value of the income interest. Tax policy analysis demon-
strates that estate tax inclusion addresses potentially more abuses than
rules addressing gift tax valuation but does not itself provide a basis
for choosing between these approaches. The comprehensive tax base
ideal provides no such basis as it does not answer questions about
presumed behavior-whether donors are more likely to misvalue gifts
and to fail to exercise retained rights than to transfer services or to
retain control. Nor do tax policy norms of valuation and liquidity pro-
vide a basis. Inclusion rules permit more accurate valuation,121 and
gift tax approaches assure greater taxpayer liquidity.12 Yet, tax policy
analysis provides no means of trading valuation off against liquidity.
Tax policy analysis has even greater difficulty accounting for the hi-
erarchy among GRITs, preferred stock freezes and buy-sell agree-
ments. This differentiation lacks any foundation in fairness or
efficiency. There is no evidence that the hierarchy treated similarly
situated taxpayers the same or that it minimized interference with pri-
vate decisions. Indeed, the hierarchy conflicts with the comprehensive
119 See IRC § 2703.
12o See IRC § 2704.
121 See Dodge, Rethinking, note 108, at 201 (noting that the "compelling reason" to tax
property when the transferor ceases to own a retained interest is that it is the only way to
accurately value amount actually transferred); Gutman, Comment, note 104, at 655 (noting
that "if postponing the taxable event results in more accurate measurement of the amount
transferred, there is no tax reason to reject deferring the taxable event").
122 A taxpayer is more likely to have funds available to pay a gift tax, which results from
a voluntary act and involves lower nominal amounts.
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tax base ideal by violating the precept that transfers should be treated
alike, notwithstanding their nature, form or time.
2. Interest Group Politics
a. Interest Groups, Politicians and Patterns of Legislation
Tax theorists do not believe that policy alone accounts for legisla-
tion; they acknowledge the power of special interests.123 In doing so,
they invoke a model of politics based on economic self interest. This
model takes as its starting point the group, persons having a common
interest. 124 Different groups have different organizational capacities.
Large diffuse interests have difficulty organizing because they cannot
prevent noncontributors from free riding upon their efforts.125 Small
cohesive interests organize more easily because they can exclude free
riders.1 26
Organization affects political reception. By simply taking public po-
sitions, politicians can appeal to diffuse interests. 27 In contrast, politi-
cians must produce legislative results to satisfy cohesive interests,128
whose organization permits close monitoring of legislation.
Diffuse and cohesive groups each produce distinct patterns of con-
flict and cooperation, which may be termed partisan confrontation
123 See Dodge, Redoing, note 2, at 336 (attributing survival of stepped-up basis rule to
"inertia and the resistance of property owners and their political allies"); Graetz, Praise,
note 2, at 284-85 (discussing political obstacles posed by farmers and owners of small busi-
nesses); Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1198,1202 (attributing transfer tax cuts in ERTA to
farm and small business groups); Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax
Legislative Process, 37 Tax L. Rev. 413,444 & n.131 (1982) (attributing repeal of carryover
basis to pressure from farm and small business groups); Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 Clev. St. L. Rev. 303, 319-22 (1976) [hereinafter Reflec-
tions] (attributing enactment of 1976 Act to farm groups).
124 An interest group has been defined as "any group that, on the basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establish-
ment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared
attitudes." David B. Tfruman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public
Opinion 33 (1951). The interest group model described in this Article is only that conven-
tionally used by tax theorists. There are, of course, more complex models that recognize
the importance of ideas and culture. See Agenda Formation (William H. Riker ed., 1993);
note 163.
125 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 165 (1976) ("[L]arge or latent groups have no tendency voluntarily to act to further
their common interests.").
126 Cohesiveness is not the only factor affecting organization. Financial capacity also
affects the ability to organize. See Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized
Interests and American Democracy 65-73 (1986) (noting that interest group representation
is skewed toward business groups and against those representing the less advantaged).
127 See David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 132 (1974) ("[I]n a
large class of legislative undertakings the electoral payment is for positions rather than for
effects.").
128 See id. at 92 (noting importance of credit claiming in appealing to interest groups).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
308 [Vol. 51:TAX LAW REVIEW
1996] WEALTH TAX POLICY 309
and interest group accommodation.129 In partisan confrontation, high
profile politicians, such as the President and congressional leadership,
pursue partisan ends, most importantly seizing control of the White
House or Congress. Appealing to the public at large, they stake out
ideological and social class positions. On issues of revenue, Republi-
cans generally advocate low taxes while Democrats favor taxing the
rich.1 0
In interest group accommodation, organized interest groups push
low visibility proposals, opposed principally by the media, congres-
sional staff and executive bureaucracy. 131 Incumbent politicians react
by cooperating across party lines132 and logrolling legislation. Institu-
tions display varying responsiveness to such groups. In tax legislation,
the President and the Treasury Department are traditionally the most
independent, 133 while within Congress, the House of Representatives
129 These patterns correspond to the distributive and redistributive patterns first de-
scribed by Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory, 16 World Pol. 677, 692-95, 703-15 (1967). See also Randall B. Ripley & Grace A.
Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy 17-20,21-22 (5th ed. 1991); David J.
Vogler, The Politics of Congress 193-99 (1974) (describing patterns); James Q. Wilson,
Political Organizations 153 (Princeton Univ. Press 1995) (1973). 1 use the terms "partisan
confrontation" and "interest group accommodation" to clarify that these patterns do not
refer to "distribution" as used in the economic literature.
13m See Susan B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation 72 (1983) ("Democrats supposedly
prefer higher taxes (to finance more government services) and more progressive forms of
taxation; Republicans have historically opted for lower taxes, especially on business, and
flat rate or regressive taxes."); Witte, Politics, note 70, at 358 (noting Democrats preference
for progressivity); id. at 367-68 ("[I]t appears that most people perceive a substantial differ-
ence between parties on the issues of tax cutting (in 1980) and progressivity (1972,
1976).").
131 See Steven Kelman, Making Public Policy 62 (1987) (describing tendencies of con-
gressional staff and journalists to "regard themselves as representatives for poorly organ-
ized groups and as people trying to do the right thing").
132 See Mayhew, note 127, at 105 (describing the "cult of un-versalism [that] has the
appearance of a cross-party conspiracy among incumbents to keep their jobs").
133 See Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provi-
sions Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1145,1164-66 (1957) (describing Treasury as champion
of fairness and equity).
The President's high visibility and broad constituency makes him least vulnerable to in-
terest group pressure. See Kelman, note 131, at 83-87 (ascribing the President's public
spiritedness to voters' conception of the Presidency); Mayhew, note 127, at 169 ("Since
presidents can be held individually accountable for broad policy effects and states of af-
fairs, they are likely to go about their business with a vigorous insistence on instrumental
rationality."). In addition, executive agencies focus on policy goals. See Kelman, note 131,
at 112-13 (describing tendencies of civil servants to promote the missions of their agency).
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and Ways & Means Committee exercise more autonomy 134 than the
Senate 135 and Senate Finance Committee.13 6
b. Understanding of the Estate Freeze Legislation: Seesaw Battle
Between Organized and Unorganized Interests
An interest group model of politics views the estate freeze legisla-
tion as a battle pitting large diffuse interests (the public at large)
against small cohesive ones (those subject to the tax). This alignment
underlies the legislative process. The estate freeze legislation alter-
nated between partisan confrontation and interest group
accommodation. 137
i. Patterns in the Estate Freeze Legislation
Section 2036(c) originated in the partisan confrontation of the late
1980's.138 Democrats yearned to capture the Presidency while Repub-
licans dreamt of controlling Congress.' 39 Seeking to mobilize public
opinion, the parties emphasized their ideological differences.1 40
134 Some attribute this to the rules governing amendment on the House floor. See John
F. Manley, The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means 223 (1970)
("The closed rule acts as a shield for Ways & Means bills against hundreds of interest
group demands that would be articulated if not fulfilled if the bill appeared naked on the
floor.").
135 See id. at 279 ("Senate decisions [on tax bills] are more in line with the demands of
interest groups, lobbyists, and constituents than House decisions.").
136 See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees 181-84 (1973); Thomas J.
Reese, The Politics of Taxation 164 (1980) (noting that the Senate Finance Committee
"responds to interest group pressures by being more generous with tax expenditures and
tax cuts than the House tax committee").
137 Cf. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Leg-
islative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 11-30
(1990) (noting cycles of reform and instrumentalism in the income tax).
Particular tax proposals commonly shift between partisan confrontation and interest
group accommodation. For example, Democrats supported a tax on luxury goods that was
enacted in 1990 as a means of soaking the rich, but supported repeal of that same tax two
years later because of its economic impact on particular industries. See Tim Gray, Ways
and Means Democrats Forge Tax Package; Stage Set for Battle over Tax Rate Increases, 49
Tax Notes 255, 257 (Oct. 15, 1990); Lawrence J. Haas, Jet Set Tax Woes, 23 Nat'l J. 2177
(1991).
138 See Walter J. Olezek, The Context of Congressional Policy Making in Divided De-
mocracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress 79, 93-95 (James
A. Thurber ed., 1991).
139 Divided government aggravates the natural institutional rivalry between President
and Congress. See Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, an Interpretation 116
(1940) ("There can be no doubt that, in its own eyes, Congress establishes its prestige when
it either refuses to let the president have his own way, or compels him to compromise with
it.").
140 See Samuel Kernell, Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Cir-
cumstance, in The Politics of Divided Government 87, 97 (Gary W. Cox & Samuel Kernell
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Republicans advocated low taxes and Democrats argued for higher
taxes on the wealthy.141
Section 2036(c) came to the fore in the midst of this clash. In the
summer of 1987, President Reagan set the tone by blasting the "tax
and spend" Democrats in Congress and promising to veto any bill in-
creasing taxes.142 Congressional Democrats countered by drafting a
partisan budget bill reaching out to traditional Democratic constituen-
cies. 143 Among the bill's "soak the rich" provisions was § 2036(c).14
The budget bill struck a two-year agreement, during which taxation
fell off the partisan agenda.
Throughout this period, organized interest groups wielded little in-
fluence on the estate freeze legislation.145 The enactment of § 2036(c)
in 1987 may have caught them unprepared 146 and the breadth of the
provision became apparent only over time.147 Estate planners made
their views known in 1988 but without much success. 48
In 1989, partisan interest in taxation resumed, now focused on Pres-
ident Bush's proposed cut in the maximum tax rate on capital gains.
eds., 1991) ("More commonly, the conflict and impasse a divided government frequently
inspires are not borne of frustration from failing in a sincere search for a mutually accepta-
ble policy, rather, they are more calculated and designed to yield advantage in the next
election."); see also id. ("Polarization often has very beneficial results. If everything is
handled through compromise and conciliation, if there are no real issues dividing us from
the Democrats, why should the country change and make us the majority?") (quoting
House Republican Whip, Richard Cheney).
141 See Lawrence . Haas, The Capital Gains Game, 22 Nat'l J. 2569 (1990) ("While the
Democrats' Far Left has turned to soak-the-rich themes, the Republicans' Hard Right has
clung ever more fiercely to the party's trademark 'no-new-taxes' pledge... Democrats
want to be Democrats; Republicans want to be Republicans. Only by distinguishing their
party from their opponents' can each side hope to ever get what it wants-for the Demo-
crats, the White House; for the Republicans, a Republican Senate, if not a GOP House.").
142 See Reagan Again Hits Road to Deride Congress' "Tax and Spend" Policy, Hous.
Chron., July 27, 1987, at A12.
'43 See Lawrence J. Haas, Witching Hour for the '88 Budget, 19 Nat'l J. 1787 (1987).
144 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, note 35, at 1041-44, reprinted in 1987-3 C.B. 1, 151.
145 See John A. Bogdanski & Lawrence R. Brown, Farewell to "Freezes": Section
2036(c), 42 Tax Notes 1633,1653 (Mar. 27,1989) ("Until now, the legislative process result-
ing in section 2036(c) has seemed devoid of effective lobbying by private 'special interests.'
... [S]ection 2036(c) seems the product of just a single interest-the government itself.");
Dees, note 39, at 877 (noting § 2036(c) "was drafted from a perspective of those who had
seen only abusive freezes").
146 Bogdanski & Brown, note 145, at 1653 (suggesting that § 2036(c) "slipped into the
Code without the notice of vocal private interests").
147 For one planner's perspective, see Dees, note 39, at 877 ("For every well-meaning
but ill-conceived theory advanced, someone in Washington was willing to assert that, of
course, Section 2036(c) applied and it was drafted that way intentionally. Thus grew the
Monster.").
148 See generally Moore Statement, note 38, at 101.
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President Bush had made the cut a top priority, and congressional
Democrats dug their heels in opposition.
149
This resumption did not affect the estate freeze issue, which in early
1989 fell prey to interest group accommodation. 150 The tide turned
when business associations joined estate planners in urging repeal.
The center of gravity shifted from high profile politicians to organiza-
tions representing economic interests, opposed only by academics 51
and staff. This shift reversed institutional alliances. In 1987, Congress
passed § 2036(c) despite a reluctant President Reagan. In 1989, by
contrast, Treasury supported the provision 52 in the face of pressure
from Congress, where both parties proposed repeal of § 2036(c) to
attract votes on partisan issues. Republican William Archer,1 53 and
Democrat Lloyd Bentsen each included repeal in packages designed
to advance their parties' capital gains positions.1
54
The Senate Finance Committee package represented the highwater
mark of interest group accommodation on estate freezes. Widespread
criticism of the Senate Finance bill gaye the estate freeze issue a parti-
san taint.' 55 Caught between heavy lobbying and the claim that repeal
of § 2036(c) was a concession to special interests, Congress struck a
middle ground by repealing § 2036(c) and replacing it with the less
onerous Chapter 14.
In negotiating Chapter 14, organized interests expressed distinct
preferences among transactions. Their highest priority was weakening
149 See Lawrence J. Haas, Gaining Political Capital, 21 Nat'l J. 2132, 2132 (1989)
(describing capital gains debate as an opportunity to "remind voters of the Democrats'
traditional strength as the party of 'average' Americans").
150 Interest groups often require time to mobilize against taxes on inherited wealth. The
enactment of carryover basis and a generation skipping transfer tax in 1976 attracted more
lobbying after enactment than before. Carryover basis was repealed in 1980 and the
generation skipping transfer tax was replaced in 1986. See note 68.
151 See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 343 (statement of Elias Clark) ("I am not
convinced that section 2036(c) is so lacking in merit or unworkable as to justify its aban-
donment without further effort to correct its deficiencies."); Bogdanski & Brown, note 145,
at 1634 (concluding "that, despite poor draftsmanship, [§ 2036] is quite sensible as a matter
of policy"); Dodge, Rethinking, note 108, at 200-01; Edward J. McCaffery, The Iceman
Cometh Again: Return of the Estate Freeze?, 46 Tax Notes 1327, 1328 (Mar. 12, 1990)
("While the current law is certainly unworkable, we should be suspicious of the reform
claims advocated by the few directly affected by the law.").
152 See Miscellaneous Tax Bill Hearing, note 38, at 136-37 (1989) (statement of Dana
Trier, Tax Legis. Counsel, Treas. Dep't) (opposing repeal of § 2036(c) on revenue grounds).
153 See ESOP Amendments Win Out; Panel Rejects Capital Gain Plan, 89 TNT 145-1,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File (July 14, 1989) (describing Archer's "all-
encompassing proposal").
154 See Crenshaw, Panel, note 48, at Al (quoting Senator Bensten as saying, "I couldn't
beat something with nothing.").
155 Repeal of § 2036(c) was viewed as a troubling tax break. See id.; see also Jeffrey 1-1.
Birnbaum, Senate Panel's Tax Measure Is Jammed With Billions of Dollars in Giveaways,
Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1989, at A4.
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the buy-sell provision contained in the staff Discussion Draft. 56 The
traditional preferred stock freeze ranked a distinct second, and the
GRIT received the least attention. 5 7
U. Gaps in the Interest Group Model
The conventional narrow interest group model of politics does not
explain certain aspects of the estate freeze legislation. First, that
model does not account for the dynamics of legislation. Because orga-
nizational capacity remains relatively constant, the interest group
model suggests a static struggle between beneficiaries and victims of
tax proposals. Thus, the model describes but does not explain the
fluctuations between partisan confrontation and interest group accom-
modation. It identifies the patterns but not the reason they shift.
Second, the interest group model does not account for specific lob-
bying positions. That model gives no hint of the arguments that tran-
scend self interest. Economic interest would suggest that groups
would be indifferent among forms of relief so long as the tax savings
were the same. Yet, organized interests gave priority to repeal of an
inclusion rule over other benefits such as wider exclusions and whole-
sale rate cuts.
Nor does interest group politics explain why organized interests lob-
bied for buy-sell agreements more than preferred stock freezes and
for preferred stock freezes more than GRITs.ls8 There is no evidence
that these preferences maximized tax savings. If anything, these pref-
erences ran counter to economic self interest. Tax savings alone
156 See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 270 (statement of David R. Burton, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce) (describing buy-sell provision of the Discussion Draft as "univer-
sally viewed within the business community as unacceptable"); id. at 163 (statement of
Thomas K. Zaucha, Small Bus. Legis. Council) (arguing for the deletion of buy-sell
provision).
This effort was successful. The Discussion Draft disregarded all options held by family
members in valuing property, see note 54, whereas Chapter 14 disregarded only those con-
taining terms not comparable to similar arrangements made by those operating at arm's
length. See IRC § 2703(b)(3).
157 See Burton Statement, note 156, at 274 (mentioning trusts towards end of submis-
sion); Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 146-50 (statement of Donald Carlson, Nat'l
Ass'n of Wholesaler-Distribs.) (omitting mention of trusts); Zaucha Statement, note 156, at
167-72 (same).
M5s These lobbying positions do not seem to reflect the perspectives of different groups.
All these arrangements were part of the standard estate planning repertoire. Moreover, to
the extent that groups had different perspectives, one would expect that estate planners
who favor GRITs would have been the most cohesive and exerted the greatest power.
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would have favored the more popular GRIT 5 9 over the expensive
preferred stock freeze.
160
C. The Public Discourse of Symbols and Stories
As established above, the abstract descriptions of tax policy analysis
and interest group politics both have gaps. These gaps can be filled by
looking to pervasive cultural understandings, evident in the public dis-
course, by which I mean the common, everyday symbols and stories
found in newspapers and congressional hearings. These understand-
ings comprise the terrain' 6' in which policy analysis and interest group
politics operate. 162 Constructs from the public discourse define policy
problems163 and frame issues around which interest groups organ-
159 Informal surveys at estate planner conferences attended by the author during the
debate over estate freeze legislation revealed that most planners had used GRITs, while
only a handful had used a stock freeze. In addition, legal commentary indicates that
GRITs were far more popular than the congressional testimony suggested. Search of
WESTLAW, Tax Law Reviews, Texts and Periodicals (Feb. 25, 1995) (108 articles pub-
lished between 1986 and 1991 discussing § 2036(c) and preferred stock, in contrast to 72
articles discussing that section and GRITs). Surveys taken after the enactment of Chapter
14 suggest that trusts are more popular estate planning tools than corporate freezes. See
Malcolm A. Moore & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Practicing What We Preach: Esoteric or Essen-
tial?, 27 Philip E. Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan. 1216 (1993) (survey finding that estate
planners discuss grantor trusts with clients more often than they discuss corporate freezes).
160 The corporate stock freeze usually entails a costly recapitalization prior to the gift.
See, e.g., Freeman, note 27, at 2-1 to 2-132.
161 See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1443, 1502 (1990) [hereinafter Indeterminacy] (describing cultural
understandings as a "sedimented social field in which transformative efforts necessarily
take place").
162 See Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Pro-
cess 2 (1989):
Every politician understands that arguments are needed .. to bring other
people around to this position. Even when a policy is best explained by the
actions of groups seeking selfish goals, those who seek to justify the policy
must appeal to the public interest .... Perhaps these are only rationalizations,
but even rationalizations are important since they become integral parts of
political discourse. We miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making
solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate
and argument.
(footnote omitted); McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, note 12, at 1933 ("Special interest poll-
tics clearly operate against a background of broadly popular constraints.").
163 See Roger W. Cobb & Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The
Dynamics of Agenda-Building 172-73 (2d ed., 1983) ("Policy problems are socially con-
structed. They arise not so much from events and circumstances as from the meanings that
people attribute to those events and circumstances."). For studies showing the penetration
of the public discourse into law and policy analysis generally, see Joseph R. Gusfield, The
Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order 98-99 (1981)
(describing how policy analysts use stock figures); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1984) (describing role of stories in law).
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ize.16 The public discourse is no more complete than the other ac-
counts; it does, however, fill some gaps left by them.
1. Symbols and Stories of Estate Tax Legislation
a. The Object of Taxation: Concentrations of Wealth and Family
Businesses
The public views legislation as a parade of popular symbols. 1a Two
clusters of symbols dominate transfer tax legislation. One cluster cen-
ters around the object of taxation: concentrations of wealth and fam-
ily businesses. Users of both symbols assume that taxes "destroy"
their object;166 where they differ is in their sympathy for the thing be-
ing taxed.
Since the 19th century, estate tax advocates have conjured up
images of concentrations of wealth. Andrew Carnegie argued that
"[b]y taxing estates heavily at death the State marks its condemnation
of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life." 167 Theodore Roosevelt
railed against "fortunes swollen beyond all healthy limits." 1  Herbert
Hoover decried "frozen and inactive capital."' 69 Franklin Roosevelt
164 Groups organize around popular stories and symbols because they move people to
action. See Charles D. Elder & Roger W. Cobb, The Political Uses of Symbols 28 (1983)
(noting that symbols provide the vehicle through which diverse motivations, expectations
and values are synchronized to make collective action possible); Stone, note 13, at 125
(noting that ambiguity of symbols "allows highly conflictual issues to move from stalemate
to action").
Ideology is particularly critical to the formation of small business organizations. See
Wilson, note 129, at 162-63:
Many businessmen can be attracted once to a militant, ideological cause, but
few will renew their membership after the initial enthusiasm passes .... To
sustain the interest of those who rejoin and to attract the interest of those who
might join for the first time, it is essential for the [small business] organization
to maintain a combative, ideological posture.
165 See, e.g., Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics 5 (1974):
For most men most of the time politics is a series of pictures in the mind,
placed there by television news, newspapers, magazines, and discussions. The
pictures create a moving panorama taking place in a world the mass public
never quite touches, yet one its members come to fear or cheer, often with
passion and sometimes with action.
166 See McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) ("the power to tax
involves the power to destroy"); Webster's New World Dictionary 1458 (2d College ed.
1979) (alternatively defining "tax" as "heavy demand; burden; strain").
167 Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays 22 (Edward C.
Kirkland ed., 1962).
168 18 The Works of Theodore Roosevelt 578 (1925). Later he wrote that the very large
fortunes "are needless and useless, for they make no one really happy and increase no
one's usefulness, and furthermore they do infinite harm and they contain the threat of far
greater harm." Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Jacob August Riis (Apr. 18, 1906), in 5
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt 212 (Elting E. Morison ed., 1952).
169 2 The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover 29 (1952).
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attacked "great accumulations of wealth" and the transmission of
"vast fortunes."1 70
Critics of the estate tax appealed to the family business, a symbol
that draws upon both the image of the family and the story of the
founder. 171 Nineteenth century criticisms stressed the effect of the tax
on families, 172 while arguments made in the 1920's and 1930's empha-
sized the burden the tax placed on the founder.1 73 A Treasury Under-
secretary argued, for instance, that high estate taxes would result in
"more golf players and fewer Henry Fords and Thomas Edisons."'1 74
In the 1970's and 1980's, critics successfully appealed to the plight of
farms and small businesses to roll back the estate tax.175
170 H.R. Rep. No. 74-1681, at 2 (1935), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (vol. 4) 643; see also
Hearings on Internal-Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
67th Cong. 201-03 (1921) (statement of Rep. William Ramseyer) (quoting Andrew
Carnegie).
171 See Michael Patrick Allen, The Founding Fortunes: A New Anatomy of the Super-
Rich Families in America 103 (1987) ("The focal point for the social identity of the corpo-
rate rich family is the founding entrepreneur."); Edward N. Saveth, The American Patri-
cian Class: A Field for Research, 15 Am. Q. 235, 238 (1963) ("[I]t is the achieving
individuals within the achieving family who become family history.").
172 See 31 Cong. Rec. 5081 (1898) (statement of Sen. Allen) (asking whether the state
should "stand with the widow and the children at the grave side of a dead father to collect
a tax").
173 See Proposed Taxation of Individual and Corporate Incomes, Inheritances and
Gifts: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong. 279, 295 (1935)
[hereinafter 1935 Hearing] (appendix to statement of Roy C. Osgood, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce):
To the extent that the desire to assure continuance in a family of the possession
and development of a going business is a strong inducement to the hard appli-
cation of energy and prudent administration of affairs, the knowledge that es-
tate and inheritance taxes will defeat such a purpose would mean inevitably a
lessening of incentive upon the part of men of ability.
See id. at 131 (statement of John Day Jackson, publisher and proprietor of the New Haven
Register) ("[S]ome of us who had individual businesses that we had built up ourselves and
wanted to pass on to our families ... were likely to find ourselves in a position where our
own families ... would be prevented from inheriting by virtue of" the estate tax.); id. at
198-99 (statement of Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Treas. Dep't) (describing
effect of estate tax on Henry Ford); Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong. 328 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 Hearings] (statement
of State Sen. W.S. Baird):
We want to help the individual who is willing to advance his money and take
his chances in the enterprises of the country ... ; we want him to have the
results of his enterprise himself. We do not want somebody else after he is
dead to come in and take it away through any subterfuge whatever.
See Andrew W. Mellon, Taxation: The People's Business 117-18 (1924) (noting the partic-
ularly destructive effect of estate taxes on active, closely held businesses).
174 See Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 Tax L. Rev. 223,
233 (1956) (quoting Winston, State and Federal Relations, in Inheritance Taxation, in Pro-
ceedings of Nat'l Tax Ass'n 249-51 (1925)).
175 The family business symbols played critical roles in initiatives to raise the estate tax
exemptions in 1976 and 1981. See Various Tax Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th
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Although Americans agree in principle about the threat of concen-
trations of wealth and the virtue of family businesses, they often disa-
gree over whether that threat or virtue is present in a particular case.
Whether an entity constitutes a concentration of wealth or a family
business depends upon its size and activity. Current estate tax relief
provisions for family businesses176 require that the enterprise be
small, 77 have active management 178 and involve family members per-
sonally.179 Conversely, a concentration of wealth is a large, passive
entity lacking personal involvement. A first generation family busi-
ness often becomes a concentration of wealth in succeeding
generations. 80
b. The Purpose of Taxation: Balancing the Budget
The other cluster of symbols revolves around the purpose of taxa-
tion-raising funds for the fisc. This analogy does not view taxation as
inherently destructive, but as constructive, not as an attack on de-
Cong. 1 (1980) ("[T]he estate and gift taxes have a potential devastating effect on the
family and family-owned businesses."); Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Public Hearings
and Panel Discussion Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 974
(1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings] (statement of Beulah Torgerson, farm wife) (arguing for
increased exemptions to preserve "independent, imaginative small businesses and family
farms") (quoting Sen. Gaylord Nelson); id. at 338 (statement of Walker Winter, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce) ("The consequences of the estate and gift tax can be a heavy
burden on those small enterprises which have a vital role in the country's economy.");
Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1198-202. Most recently, increasing the unified credit has
been termed a "small business incentive." See Job Creation Act, note 9, § 12,001; Frank
Swoboda, Plan Combines a Revival of Reaganomics, Reins on Regulation Series: Con-
tract with America: The Republican Agenda Series No. 8110, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1994, at
A23 (noting that increase would "make it easier to pass on small family-owned businesses
from one generation to the next").
176 The transfer tax contains two relief provisions for family businesses. See IRC
§ 2032A (providing for special use valuation for certain real property), § 6166 (granting
extension in time of payment for interests in closely held businesses). A recent bill intro-
duced by Senators Dole and Pryor creates an exclusion for family owned businesses equal
to $1.5 million plus 50% of the value of the businesses exceeding that amount. See Ameri-
can Family-Owned Business Act, S. 1086, 104th Cong. § 1(a) (1995). A similar proposal
was included in the budget bill vetoed in 1996. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1995,
I.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 11072(a) (excluding S1 million plus 50% of the excess of the
value between $1 million and $2.5 million). President Clinton's proposed 1997 budget also
liberalized § 6166. See Statutory Language for Tax Provisions in President Clinton's Pro-
posed Fiscal 1997 Budget § 9303 (1995).
177 The special valuation benefit is limited to $750,000. See IRC § 2032A(a)(2).
178 Section 2032A requires that the land be used in a business, IRC § 2032A(b)(2), and
§ 6166 excludes companies holding "passive assets," IRC § 6166(b)(9).
179 Section 2032A requires that the heirs materially participate in management of the
farm or business. IRC § 2032A(c).
IS See generally Barbara S. Hollander & Nancy Elman, Family-Owned Businesses: An
Emerging Field of Inquiry, 1 Fam. Bus. Rev. 145, 151-56 (1988) (describing life cycle of a
family business).
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spised persons, but as a voluntary contribution to a common welfare.
Whereas symbols associated with the object of taxation divide society
into warring factions, those based on the budget rally people around a
shared goal.' 8 '
Budgetary symbols presume that citizens pay taxes in return for
goods and services and that the government budget itself is the sum of
individual preferences. The level of spending depends upon the value
received for each tax dollar: Tax increases provide needed "serv-
ices;"'l  tax cuts reduce unnecessary "waste."'' a 3 Balanced budgets
represent the fiscal responsibility'8 4 necessary for living within one's
means. As such, they constitute a point of concurrence. Although
Americans argue over whether taxes should be cut or increased, they
agree that the budget should be balanced. 185
Americans historically have supported balancing the federal
budget.18 6 Prior to the Civil War, most believed that balanced budgets
combatted political corruption by limiting the size of the central gov-
181 See Elder & Cobb, note 164, at 122 (distinguishing between symbols of differentia-
tion and cohesion); Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the Ameri-
can Temperance Movement 171-72 (1963) ("[G]estures of cohesion .. serve to fix the
common and consensual aspects of the society as sources of governmental support....
Gestures of differentiation point to the glorification or degradation of one group in opposi-
tion to others within the society.").
182 See Thomas J. Anton, Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expendi-
tures, 11 Midwest J. Pol. Sci. 27, 40 (1967) ("The need [to justify increased expenditures] is
met by resorting to the imagery of 'services' provided by the recurring increases.").
183 See id. at 40 ("Grounded in the folklore of 'rampant bureaucracy,' building 'empires'
through 'padded budgets' which 'waste the hard-earned dollar of the taxpayer,' and fed by
the demand for 'a dollar's worth of service for every dollar spent', the cut symbolizes a
popular check on governmental excess.").
184 See id. at 40 (describing balanced budget as symbol of "responsibility").
185 See Lewis H. Kimmel, Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy 1789-1958, at 57 (1959)
("[Before the civil war,] [plublic attitudes toward the federal budget were influenced by
the assumed similarity between governmental finance and private or household finance.
The criterion of family or household financial management was the ability to live within
one's income."); James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit: The
Political Legacy of Lord Keynes 21 (1977) (footnote omitted):
[T]hroughout the pre-Keynesian era, the effective fiscal constitution was based
on the central principle that public finance and private finance are analogous,
and that the norms for prudent conduct are similar. Barring extraordinary cir-
cumstances, public expenditures were supposed to be financed by taxation, just
as private spending was supposed to be financed from income.
The pre-Keynesian or classical fiscal constitution was not written in any for-
mal set of rules. It was, nonetheless, almost universally accepted.
186 See Carolyn Webber & Aaron Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in
the Western World 377 (1986) ("Though the balanced-budget concept had its ups and
downs, circumstantial evidence until the 1930's, and opinion polls thereafter, strongly indi-
cate that most citizens supported it.... Budget balanc[ing] was a meeting place for Ameri-
can political cultures.").
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ernment.187 After the Civil War, they believed that balanced budgets
promoted efficiency in a large national government.88 From roughly
1930 to 1980, opinions divided. Following John Maynard Keynes,
many economists argued that deficits were often appropriate,18 9 while
politicians adhered to the balanced budget ideal. 90 Since 1980, how-
ever, balanced budgets once again have had tremendous impact on
governmental decisions.19'
2. The Public Discourse in the Estate Freeze Legislation
As demonstrated above, tax policy analysis and interest group poli-
tics leave open crucial questions about the process and product of the
estate freeze legislation. These perspectives neither indicate why
Congress acted when it did, nor do they describe why Chapter 14 fo-
cused on the initial gift or differentiated among GRITs, preferred
stock freezes and buy-sell agreements.
187 See Kimmel, note 185, at 55 (noting general agreement before the Civil War that -a
low level of public expenditures was desirable" and that "the federal budget should be
balanced in time of peace"); James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics
158 (1988) ("[U]nbalanced federal budgets contributed to the growth of the large public
and private institutions that Jefferson and Jackson believed threatened individual liberty,
agrarian democracy, and the authority of the state governments.").
1ss See Kimmel, note 185, at 221 ("In the early 1930's the balanced budget idea re-
mained firmly embedded in the social fabric"); Savage, note 187, at 159 ("[From the civil
war through 1932], [t]he Republican party essentially replaced the corruption theme's rea-
soning for opposing unbalanced budgets with the Progressives' notion of administrative
efficiency.").
189 See Kimmel, note 185, at 306 (The change in outlook on fiscal and budgetary mat-
ters that has occurred since 1930 is best described as revolutionary .... the balancing or
stabilizing role of governmental fiscal operations is widely recognized."); Savage, note 187,
at 184 (describing elite acceptance of deficit spending from 19334980); Herbert Stein, The
Fiscal Revolution in America 454 (1969) ("By the time the tax cut of 1964 was enacted,
budget-balancing had ceased to have an important influence on fiscal decisions and com-
pensatory finance had taken its place as standard doctrine.").
190 Franklin Roosevelt never completely accepted deficit spending. See Savage, note
187, at 169-72. President Eisenhower held to his belief that "[b]alancing the budget will
always remain a goal of any administration." Id. at 175. Later presidents retained the
balanced budget notion in their adherence to a full employment budget. See id. at 182-86;
Stein, note 189, at 454 (noting continuing references to balanced budgets in the form of
full-employment budgets or beliefs that the budget should be balanced when high employ-
ment was reached).
191 Abandoning the full employment budget idea, President Carter returned to the bal-
anced budget as a principal concern. See Savage, note 187, at 190-92. Despite budget
deficits, President Reagan consistently supported a balanced budget, see id. at 221-22, and
so did Congress by enacting the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
(Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177,99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Savage, note 187, at 235 ("The
significance of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is that it reaffirms the political importance of
balanced budgets.").
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The public discourse addresses these questions. It explains why
Congress took up the issue. Popular symbols and stories generated
the broad support necessary for the passage of legislation. Moreover,
these archetypes were no mere subterfuge. They also played a power-
ful role in the substantive decisions underlying Chapter 14.
a. Passage of Legislation
Passage of legislation requires more than interest group pressure or
policy analysis. The many hurdles to passage of legislation1 92 make
mass support, or at least acquiescence, necessary for a bill to become
law. In the estate freeze saga, the public discourse provided just such
support. The budget problem appeared as objective reality to Demo-
crats and Republicans alike. The family business symbol generated
support far beyond the economic stakes of owners of farms and small
businesses.1 93
Each cluster of symbols played a different role in the estate freeze
legislation. The budget problem provided the occasion for taking ac-
tion. It engaged those lacking interest in the details of taxation and
transcended partisan interests. Although disputing the level of federal
spending, Democrats and Republicans agreed that the budget should
be balanced and that steps should be taken to reduce the deficit.
Budget politics played a critical role in enacting § 2036(c) in 1987.
Democrats would not have marked up a tax bill had budget reconcilia-
192 See generally McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 16-21 (1994) (describing "veteogates"
through which legislation must pass to be enacted).
193 See Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 285 (noting that clout of owners of small businesses and
farms "far outweighs their actual stake in general estate tax policies"); see also Gutman,
Reforming, note 2, at 1210 (noting that family businesses constitute only 7% of the gross
value of reported transfers subject to estate tax); Nat'l Resource Economics and Nat'l Eco-
nomic Analysis Divisions, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Contemporary Studies Project: Large
Farm Estate Planning and Probate in Iowa, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 797, 929-30 (1974) (finding
that farmers' estates had sufficient liquidity to pay estate taxes).
Furthermore, transfer tax provisions designed to protect the family business provide lit-
tle benefit because modem dispositional practices would break up most family businesses
anyway. See Carole Shammas, Marylynn Salmon & Michel Dahlin, Inheritance in
America from Colonial Times to the Present 211-12 (1987):
[O]ur findings cast doubt on the belief... that parental desires to perpetuate
family fortunes would, if only such disincentives as estate and inheritance taxes
were removed, play an important role in capital formation.... Once physical
wealth could be converted more easily into cash and financial assets, inheri-
tance became more egalitarian among the majority of wealth holders, but capi-
tal also became less concentrated and less often channeled directly into
production.
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tion not required revenues, and that bill might not have passed 194 if
the stock market crash had not focused attention on the deficit.195
Budget politics created the opportunity for later activity as well.
The two-year agreement struck in 1987 diverted attention from taxa-
tion in 1988, while the renewed obligation to meet Graham-Rudman
goals provided the occasion for the Senate Finance Committee bill in
1989. In 1990, even after two years of lobbying, estate freezes still
only occupied an intermediate place on the agenda.196 Enactment of
Chapter 14 awaited yet another budget bill.
Despite their influence on the overall legislative agenda, the budget
symbols had little impact on priorities within the tax agenda. Rather,
the concentration of wealth and family business symbols mobilized
support. Those symbols broke legislative impasses and changed legis-
lative fortunes. Seldom discussed in legislative hearings,197 the con-
centration of wealth symbol nevertheless prompted the initial interest
in estate freezes. The "soak the rich" theme sounded by the Demo-
cratic leadership in 1987 provided fertile soil for enacting § 2036(c).
Conversely, the family business symbol was critical to generating
resistance to § 2036(c). Technical objections made by estate planners
had little effect. The repeal movement did not gain momentum until
interest groups appealed to the plight of family businesses. That ap-
peal was not limited to groups claiming to represent small business.
General business groups sent family business owners to testify against
the provision 98 and trade associations portrayed their members as
194 Before the crash, Sen. J. James Exon had predicted "the greatest series of confronta-
tions that anyone living today has ever seen between the executive and legislative branch,"
quoted in Tom Kenworthy, Reagan, Hill in Countdown to Automatic Spending Cuts,
Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1987, at Al.
195 After the largest one day drop ever in the stock market on October 19, 1987, Presi-
dent Reagan called for a financial summit with congressional leaders to reduce the deficit.
See Lou Cannon, Reagan Pledges Deficit Negotiations in Bid to Calm Market; Tax Boost
No Longer Ruled Out; Economy Called Sound, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1987, at Al.
196 See Crenshaw, Tackling, note 52, at F6 (describing estate freeze controversy as "a
major sideline on Capitol Hill," after capital gains and "other revenue struggles"); Law-
rence J. Haas, Thinking Small, 22 Nat'I J. 841, 843 (1990) (describing § 2036(c) as part of a
small-item agenda).
197 These hearings provided a forum principally for those opposing estate freeze
legislation.
198 See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 261 (statement of Richard Larson, Nat'l
Ass'n of Mfrs.) (chairman of the board of a family-owned and operated business); Carlson
statement, note 157, at 146 (president of a family-owned business).
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small family businesses.19 Even the American Bar Association
branded § 2036(c) as "the anti-family business provision. '
'200
These groups elaborately developed the family business symbol.
They presented stories of the founder, who leaves his job, musters
meager resources and devotes time, money and labor to building up a
successful business.20o The groups also conjured up familial images.
202
A tightly knit family itself,203 the business also displayed compassion
and commitment 20 4  toward its employees, consumers and
community.
20 5
199 See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 392 (statement of William E. Galbraith,
Nat'l Am. Equip. Dealers Ass'n) ("Many of our members are operating family businesses
which have been passed down through several generations."); id. at 308 (statement of Paul
B. Horsey, Sr., Nat'l Home Furnishings Ass'n) ("While we represent retailers of all sizes
and shapes, the 'classic' member is the independently-owned, family-owned, main street
retailer.").
200 See Miscellaneous Tax Bill Hearing, note 38, at 151 (statement of L. Henry Gissel,
Jr., Am. Bar A'ssn).
201 See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 301 (statement of David McKenney,
Sheet Metal & Air Conditioning Contractors' Nat'l Ass'n) (appealing to "the en-
trepreneurial heritage of the American worker who puts down his tools, starts a business
and if he becomes successful, dreams of passing the business onto future generations"); see
also id. at 299:
My great-grandfather... founded the company in Southwest Washington State
in 1890, as we say with '50 men and 12 horses.' I represent the fourth genera-
tion of ownership and some of the children of my generation-those being the
fifth generation-have completed their education and are starting with the
company. They are preparing to continue business.
(statement of William G. Reed, Jr., Chairman, Simpson Timber Co.); id. at 314 (statement
of Leo Weber, Weber Elec. Inc.) ("Like many construction business owners, I spent many
long years in training before I became an entrepreneur.... [After 18 years,] I borrowed
$10,000 from a friend, purchased three used trucks, rented space in a (sic) old butcher
shop; and opened up Weber Electric Inc.); Horsey Statement, note 199, at 306:
My training started 45 years ago working in and learning the retail furniture
business.... I also wanted a family owned furniture business. Thirty-three
years ago, I moved to Virginia and have operated a family business since.
Now, our desire is that our family business will be around another 33 years and
longer, hopefully.
202 See Weber Statement, note 201, at 314 ("Not only has my business grown over the
past 30 years but so has my family.... Two of my sons work for Weber Electric, and my
youngest son is currently undergoing apprenticeship training.").
203 See Zaucha Statement, note 156, at 165; Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 283
(statement of James H. Woody, Union Tel. Co.) ("My grandfather founded our company in
1914.... Today, my father, mother, wife, two brothers, sister, son and nephew work for the
company.").
204 See Reed Statement, note 201, at 299 ("[Fjamily businesses can be more interested in
long-term goals rather than short-term profits."); Larson Statement, note 198, at 265 ("A
family firm does not measure its success quarter by quarter. It takes a longer view
stretching years or decades into the future.").
205 See Woody Statement, note 203, at 286 ("We also employ nearly 30 others from the
local community.... [W]e have made a commitment to our customers and our commu-
nity."); see also Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 241, 243 (statement of Gerard 0.
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Finally, the clash of popular symbols underlay the final resolution
reached in 1990. On one side, business groups invoked the family
business symbol against § 2036(c). On the other, newspaper descrip-
tions of repeal revived the image of concentrations of wealth; 06 In
the end, Congress respected both symbols by repealing § 2036(c) and
enacting the more lenient Chapter 14.
b. Substantive Decisions
Not only does the public discourse mobilize support, it also influ-
ences substantive decisions. Popular symbols and stories fill gaps in
abstract tax policy and interest group explanations. Shaping beliefs
about which transactions abuse the tax system and which lobbying po-
sitions persuade, the family business and concentration of wealth sym-
bols left their imprint on Chapter 14.207
The public discourse explains, as tax policy analysis and interest
group politics cannot, why Congress replaced estate tax inclusion with
rules aimed at valuing the gift of the income interest. Tax policy anal-
ysis describes potential abuses but not why Congress addressed some
and not others. Interest group politics explains the conflict among
economic interests but not the attraction of a regime that increased
the gift tax value of the income interest.
The public discourse fills these gaps. In that discourse, § 2036(c)
was portrayed as destroying family businesses. The section created a
potentially huge estate tax liability, leading to forced sale 08 of the
family business to a conglomerate or foreigner.2 9 Gift tax rules did
Haviland, family business consultant) ("These businesses are not just enterprises. They are
also manifestations of family values and family beliefs.").
2D6 See Birnbaum, note 155, at 4 (noting new loopholes would affect only the richest
Americans); Alan Murray, Senate Panel Democrats Opposed Gains-Tax Cut But Voted for
Giant Loopholes in Estate Levies, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1989, § 1, at A16 (describing repeal
of § 2036(c) as one of "two giant loopholes in the estate tax, benefitting only the very
wealthiest people. If the provisions become law, tax experts say, they'll go a long way
toward eliminating what little is left of the nation's only tax on inherited wealth.").
2w Budgetary symbols created the vehicle for the estate freeze legislation. Aside from
imposing revenue constraints, however, they had little impact on the contents of Chapter
14.
20 See Zaucha Statement, note 156, at 161 ("My biggest fear is that if Congress doesn't
fix it right, we will be forced to sell the business.") (quoting an association member); Dis-
cussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 251 (statement of Frank W. Greenhaw, Nat'l Retail
Hardware Ass'n) ("[Tihe assets of hardware stores are largely illiquid, and the application
of heavy estate taxes, therefore, often causes the break-up of these businesses."); id. at 256
(statement of Frank Merlino, Associated Gen'l Contractors of Am.) ("Since section
2036(c) has been enforced, these family-ovmed entities have been faced with a major deci-
sion as to whether they want to continue operating as a family entity or sell their com-
pany."); Horsey Statement, note 199, at 308-09 (describing liquidation of family business).
2w See Carlson Statement, note 157, at 147 ("Studies of our industry point to a steady
trend away from closely-held private corporations to more publicly and foreign-ovned en-
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not have that effect. A voluntary act, a gift is unlikely to create a huge
tax liability.
Likewise, the public discourse explains differentiation among trans-
actions. Conventional understanding of tax policy analysis and inter-
est group politics cannot explain the hierarchy within Chapter 14. In
fact, that hierarchy runs contrary to such understandings. The com-
prehensive tax base ideal treats economically identical transactions
the same. Economic self interest points to intense lobbying for the
GRIT, which, in fact, received the least support.
The concentration of wealth and family business symbols, however,
ground these distinctions. Transactions evoking concentration of
wealth seem abusive; transactions evoking family businesses appear
legitimate, even praiseworthy.210 Accordingly, Congress reacted
harshly towards arrangements resembling estate planning for the dis-
position of a concentration of wealth, and leniently toward arrange-
ments resembling a family business transaction.
The stringent rules for GRITs reflect the widespread belief that
trusts pass wealth. Since at least the trust busting era, trusts have rep-
resented concentrations of wealth in the public eye.211 The more
favorable rules applied to preferred stock freezes mirror the popular
association of corporations with family businesses. Although some
corporations simply hold passive assets, most involve activity and joint
operation. Indeed, the presence of business and associates distinguish
a corporation from a trust.2 12 Finally, the lax rules governing buy-sell
agreements reflect the assumption that such agreements usually occur
in a small, active enterprise that unites management and ownership.
tities due to changing market forces and economies of scale"). The perception that this
rule singled out family business was fostered by its application to sales among family
members.
210 The popular symbols may underlie the reluctance to tax transfers of business oppor-
tunities and services. See 5 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of In-
come, Estates and Gifts 121.3.6, at 121-19 (2d ed. 1993) ("property" for transfer tax
purposes does not include uncompensated services); Aucutt, note 104, at 349-50 (arguing
that taxation of opportunities is "simply too intrusive into family relationships. Everyone
knows that family members advise one another, affirm one another, and assist one another
in innumerable ways. Such is the stuff of family."); Case Hoogendoorn, Transfers of Op-
portunities-An Opportunity to Avoid Transfer Tax?, 71 Taxes 892, 900-01 (1993) (exemp-
tion of transfers of opportunities necessary to encourage "family-based economic
activity").
211 See, e.g., Henry Stimson, Trusts, I Harv. L. Rev. 132 (1887) (decrying the power of
trusts).
212 See Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) ("[A]n arrangement will be treated as a trust under the
Internal Revenue Code if it can be shown that the purpose of the arrangement is to vest in
trustees responsibility for the protection and conservation of property for beneficiaries
who cannot share in the discharge of this responsibility and, therefore, are not associates in
a joint enterprise for the conduct of business for profit.").
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A principal purpose of a buy-sell agreement is to eliminate passive
owners.21
3
m. IMLICATIONS OF THE PUBLic DIsCOURSE FOR TAX THEoRY
Viewing policy and politics as largely autonomous, theorists gener-
ally regard popular symbols and stories as outside their domain.
There is, however, another vision, which, recognizing policy and pub-
lic discourse as interlocking conversations, incorporates preferences
revealed in the public discourse.
A. Divided Democracy: Symbols as Extrinsic to Policy
The dominant, scientific vision of tax theory is rooted in profes-
sional understandings. Theorists focus on a few objective tools.2 14
Their professional identity resides in the distinctive discourse shared
with colleagues,215 not in communications with a wider audience.216
In society at large, they view themselves as one interest among
many,217 preaching pristine truth to corrupt power.218
This vision limits theorist understanding of popular symbols, which
become either independent policy goals or extrinsic forces. Theorists
generally find the balanced budget, concentration of wealth and fam-
ily business symbols lacking as independent goals. Since Keynes, most
economists have believed that a balanced budget has little impact on
213 See Elliott Manning, Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements xxii (1995) ("[A] buy-sell ar-
rangement protects the active shareholders by insuring... that all corporate shares are
owned either by active shareholders or by persons who are willing to terminate ownership
when active involvement of a related person ends.").
214 See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 2-3 (describing economists' belief in speciali-
zation among the social sciences and avoidance of ethical positions).
21s See Goode, note 15, at 27 (In tax theory, "[a]cademic prestige attaches mainly to
writings addressed to other specialists."). Indeed, through texts, discourse plays an impor-
tant role in establishing and maintaining professional identities. See generally Textual Dy-
namics of the Professions: Historical and Contemporary Studies of Writing in Professional
Communities (Charles Bazerman & James Paradis eds., 1991) (providing case studies in
textual construction of the professions, dynamics of discourse communities and operational
force of texts).
216 See Klamer, note 16, at 151 ("The conventional picture of science [adopted in eco-
nomics] deletes the role of the audience altogether.").
217 See Bruce Jennings, Counsel and Consensus: Norms of Argument in Health Policy,
in The Argumentative Urn in Policy Analysis and Planning 101,102 (Frank Fischer & John
Forester eds., 1993) [hereinafter Argumentative Turn] (noting tendency to incorporate
"policy analysis as simply one more specialized discourse of advocacy within a pluralistic
politics of interest group liberalism").
218 See generally Wildavsky, note 13, at 120 [check: quote is not on or near cited page]
[there is a 1987 edition of this book; I think the 1979 is cited] [ILL request 2/4197 - MSS]
("[S]peaking truth to power remains the ideal of analysts who hope they have truth, but
realize that they have not.., power.").
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national economic health.219 Likewise, tax theorists reject revenue
raising 20 and the dilution of concentrations of wealth2 1 as justifica-
tions for estate taxation. They conclude that preservation of the fam-
ily business presents no policy issue - apart from liquidity.223
Having dismissed the symbols as independent policy goals, theorists
can only view them as political forces to be accommodated in achiev-
ing predetermined objectives. The theorist becomes a suffer, catching
or avoiding waves of public opinion. Tax increases and fears of con-
centrations of wealth present opportunities for strengthening the es-
tate tax, whereas tax cuts and sympathy for family businesses present
obstacles.
Accommodation of symbols sometimes entails revising substantive
proposals. A blunt approach carves family businesses out of the es-
tate tax altogether.22 4 A subtler one crafts substantive rules that con-
form to cultural archetypes while advancing existing policy goals.
Government lawyers adopting this view might have minimized the
controversy engendered by § 2036(c) by focusing more on trusts and
less on buy-sell agreements. They might have maximized the coverage
of Chapter 14 by deliberately drawing upon the concentration of
wealth and family business symbols in drafting the statute, that is, by
219 See note 189.
220 See Gerald R. Jatscher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in Death, Taxes and Family
Property, note 74, at 40, 40-41 ("The modem state has many alternatives to death and gift
taxation. Indeed, in view of the small proportion of total receipts that these taxes contrib-
ute and the high cost of administering them, it is arguable that if the taxes were only im-
posed to raise revenue, they ought to be abolished."); Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 269 ("IT]he
estate tax has very limited potential as a source of federal revenues.").
221 See Dodge, Redoing, note 2, at 249 (noting that it is debatable whether a wealth
transfer tax curbs undue accumulations of wealth); Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1209
(criticizing claim that the goal of estate tax is breaking up concentrations of wealth);
Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 271 (describing claim that the estate tax is intended to break up
large concentrations of wealth as a myth that narrows the tax and reduces its contribution
to progressivity).
222 See Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1259-71 (describing special relief for closely held
businesses and farms as "subsidies" not conforming to "normative principles"); Kurtz &
Surrey, note 2, at 1399 (rejecting special rules for family farms or closely held businesses as
"unwise... [because they] encourage or reward one type of consumption more than an-
other"). For criticism of this social policy, see Neil E. Harl, Does Farm and Ranch Prop-
erty Need a Federal Estate and Gift Tax Break?, 68 Tax Notes 875 (Aug. 14, 1995) (finding
little reason to increase the estate tax unified credit); Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Should Small
Businesses Be Tax-Favored?, 48 Nat'l Tax J. 387, 393 (1995) (concluding that standard
equity and efficiency criteria do not support current tax subsidies).
223 See, e.g., C. Lowell Harriss, Estate Taxes and the Family-Owned Business, 38 Cal. L.
Rev. 117 (1950) (analyzing impact of estate tax on family businesses as a liquidity
problem).
224 See Graetz, Estate Tax, note 97, at 182 ("Prospects of rescuing the transfer tax sys-
tem might well be increased greatly by exempting all farms and small businesses from
estate tax."); see also text accompanying notes 176-80 (discussion of §§ 2032A and 6166).
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proposing even harsher rules for GRITs22s and conditioning the rela-
tively lenient treatment accorded corporations and buy-sell agree-
ments upon family activity and cohesion. Such revisions show some
concern for cultural understandings.
B. Democracy as Discussion: The Translation of Symbols into
Goals
Mere accommodation of popular symbols, however, still leaves
broader cultural understandings at the margins of policy analysis.
These understandings show up only in taxpayer comprehension, one
of the secondary tax policy goals. This marginalization flows from a
social vision that sharply distinguishes policy from politics. Such sharp
distinction is by no means necessary. There is, however, another vi-
sion of society that joins policy and politics. This vision defines de-
mocracy itself as discussion, 22 6  divided among interlocking
conversations occurring in different fora. 7
In this vision of society, policy analysis is but one conversation feed-
ing into a larger, public discussion.2 8 Its role is to offer a valuable
225 The drafters might have retained an inclusion rule for such trusts. See Clark State-
ment, note 151, at 343; Dodge, Rethinking, note 108, at 206; Gutman, Comment, note 104,
at 676 (all advocating hard to complete rule for trusts). Alternatively, they might have
dispensed with the exclusion for personal residence trusts. See IRC § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii).
That provision was modeled upon rules governing charitable trusts. Gifts to individuals,
however, likely enjoy less public support than do gifts to charities.
226 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchant-
ment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 256,257-58 (1989) [hereinafter Plea] (arguing for dialogic concep-
tion of politics); see generally Frank L Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986) (same).
m See Majone, note 162, at 1-2:
[D]emocracy has been called a system of government by discussion. Political
parties, the electorate, the legislature, the executive, the courts, the media, in-
terest groups, and independent experts all engage in a continuous process of
debate and reciprocal persuasion.... Each of the stages and organs of public
deliberation is independent, but only within the limits, and as a part, of the
entire process: "the free and sovereign thing is the whole process of
discussion."
(quoting Ernest Baker, Reflections on Government 37 (1958)); Robert Hoppe, Political
Judgment and the Policy Cycle: The Case of Ethnicity Policy Arguments in the Nether-
lands, in Argumentative Tarn, note 217, at 77:
In the case of democracies, [political] conflict is managed by a public debate on
and a negotiated definition of shared meanings. Policy-making becomes the
capacity to define the nature of shared meanings; it is a never-ending series of
communications and strategic moves by which various policy actors in loosely
coupled forums of public deliberation construct intersubjective meanings.
These meanings are continually translated into collective projects, plans, ac-
tions, and artifacts, which become the issues in the next cycle of political judg-
ment and meaning constructions, and so on.
(citations omitted).
228 See Majone, note 162, at 7-8:
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perspective. 229 In this vision, the larger discussion does not constrain
policy analysis; it nourishes it. Indeed, policy analysis contributes to
society only insofar as it bears upon that larger discussion. Accord-
ingly, theorists must take the language used in that larger discussion
seriously, if not uncritically.230
The larger discussion over the estate tax revolves around the bal-
anced budget, concentration of wealth and family business symbols.
Dominating estate tax legislation, these symbols transcend partisan
politics. Americans want to cut "excessive" expenditures and pay for
necessary services even if they disagree over the level of governmental
spending. Americans fear concentration of wealth and sympathize
with family business even if they dispute the boundary between the
two.
These symbols dominate the larger discussion because they evoke
vivid images that abstract policy norms do not.233 The budget symbols
The job of analysts consists in large part of producing evidence and arguments
to be used in the course of public debate.... [I]n free debate, persuasion is a
two-way interchange, a method of mutual learning through discourse. Real
debate not only lets the participants promote their own views and interests, but
also encourages them to adjust their views of reality and even to change their
values as a result of the process.
Wildavsky, note 13, at 405 (The truth analysts have to tell is in "their give and take with
others whose consent they require, not once and for all, ... , but over and over again. This
policy process is certainly exhausting, hardly exhilarating, but hopefully enlightening.");
Jennings, note 217, at 101, 102 (arguing "that policy analysis ought to be held to a ...
normative standard... that attempts to capture a civic conception of participatory govern-
ance and policy debate leading to the emergence of a guiding consensus on the fundamen-
tal and common ends of public life"); Michelman, Plea, note 226, at 258 ("Pragmatic
political argument is... constrained by a consciousness of its situation within, and answer-
ability to, a public normative culture and history-within and to, if you like, a normative
practice."); Mark H. Moore, What Sort of Ideas Become Public Ideas?, in The Power of
Public Ideas 55, 83 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1990) [hereinafter Public Ideas]:
Instead of thinking of ideas as scientific conclusions, we [analysts] must recog-
nize them as society's effort, groping in the dark, to help itself deal with intrac-
table problems. To assist in this enterprise, we must not only sharpen our own
vision of problems and possible approaches, but stay close to the society and its
current understandings.
229 See John S. Dryzek, Policy Analysis and Planning: From Science to Argument, in
Argumentative Turn, note 217, at 213 ("Instrumental rationality.., is a widely held norma-
tive model for the behavior of individuals and for the conduct of public policy."). This
model is "so pervasive that it has even reached the checkout counter magazines." Stone,
note 13, at 5.
230 See Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of
High-Risk Activities, 48 Tax L. Rev. 163, 231 (1993) ("Academics ... should be prepared
to debate culture as well as economics, applying the same rigor and skepticism in one area
that they would apply in the other."); see also Michelman, Plea, note 226, at 258 ("If prag-
matic political argument does locate itself within a public normative history, it also adopts
a critical and always potentially transformative attitude toward that history.").
231 See Moore, note 228, at 79 ("[lIt is not clear reasoning or carefully developed and
interpreted facts that make ideas convincing. Rather, ideas seem to become anchored in
peoples's minds through illustrative anecdotes, simple diagrams and pictures, or connec-
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evoke a ledger book, a concrete picture lacking in economic models
of inflation and full employment2 2 and a human agentm- missing in
institutional decisions. -- Family businesses and concentrations of
wealth conjure up images such as those in Frank Capra's It's a Won-
derful Life, which pits the communitarian savings and loan against the
plutocratic banker.P5 For most people, tax policy norms like horizon-
tal equity and capital formation are substantially less gripping.236
Unfortunately, the imagery that makes these symbols easily grasped
may also make them too particular and unreliable2 7 to be unmediated
policy goals. The image of a ledger book with offsetting debits and
tions with broad common sense ideologies that define human nature and social responsibil-
ities."); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225,2276 (1989) [hereinafter Cognitive Dimen-
sion] ("The grounding of all human cognition in experience means that there is a greater
cognitive 'clout' to images from lived experience as compared to propositional formula-
tions that attempt to 'literalize' their meaning.").
22 See Stein, note 189, at 4 (defining fiscal policy as the "policy about the large aggre-
gates in the budget-total expenditures and total receipts and the difference between
them-as directed toward affecting certain overall characteristics of the economy, such as
employment and unemployment, price levels, and the total share of government activity in
the economy").
233 See Anton, note 182, at 40 ("[IThe budget, as document and process, creates sym-
bolic satisfaction built upon the idea that affairs of state are being dealt with, that responsi-
bility is being exercised, and that rationality prevails.").
24 See id. at 36-38 (noting that government budgets are largely determined largely by
impersonal forces).
23 It's a Wonderful Life (Liberty Films 1946). This struggle continues in American films
of the 1980's. See Other People's Money (Warner Brothers 1991) (corporate raider dis-
mantles family business); Wall Street (TWentieth Century Fox 1987) (Wail Street magnate
plans to take over airline and fire its employees).
236 Cognitive science suggests an analogy for understanding the relationship of popular
symbols to tax policy analysis. Research indicates that categories first develop at a basic
level and become more abstract according to the situation. See Eleanor Rosch, Principles
of Categorization, in Cognition and Categorization 27 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd
eds., 1978); see also Diane Gillespie, The Mind's We: Contextualism in Cognitive Psychol-
ogy 169 (1992) ("In interactions with the environment, we do not easily shed [the basic]
level for the sake of abstraction alone, but go upward to abstractions and downw ard to
particulars given certain purposes or undertaken actions."); George Lakoff, Women, Fire
and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind 49 (1987) ("Basic-level
categories have an integrity of their own. They are our earliest and most natural form of
categorization. Classical taxonomic categories are later 'achievements of the imagina-
tion."'). This taxonomy makes the basic level the common denominator and the abstract
category the understanding of specialists. For example, the biological categories of family
and genus exemplify basic and abstract categories. The genus level was established at the
level at which most human beings could perceive distinctions. As such, it coincided with
folk understandings. See id., at 34-36. Lacking such grounding, the more abstract category
of family is the domain of the specialist.
Although not basic in this sense, the balanced budget, concentration of wealth and fam-
ily business symbols have more basic attributes than do efficiency and fairness. They con-
jure up a single mental image and are more "human sized." See id. at 4647, 51-52.
237 Cf. Winter, Cognitive Dimension, note 231, at 2259-60 (arguing that narrative lacks
the generality, unreflexivity and reliability necessary for an institutionalized discourse).
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credits does not address the treatment of particular items or the time-
table for balancing the budget. Nor do the family business and con-
centration of wealth symbols address the size of the enterprise or the
level of familial involvement. The fuzzy boundaries surrounding the
archetypes make it difficult to dispose of these symbols once and for
all. They crop up over and over again in legislation.238 Moreover, the
archetypes inspire overbroad rules with unintended beneficiaries. An
owner of passive wealth can shop for tax results simply by adopting a
form associated with the family business, by freezing her estate with a
corporation rather than a trust, for example.239
Although perhaps untenable as policy goals themselves, the budget,
family business and concentrations of wealth symbols still provide im-
portant evidence of social preferences neglected in theorist pursuit of
the universal and quantifiable. To access those preferences, theorists
must translate240 the public discourse into tax policy terminology.
Translation is a huge task, which this Article only begins.
Translation permits tax theorists to learn from the legislative track
record of the last 50 years. To identify neglected goals, they can ex-
amine the family business symbol recently so powerful in wealth tax
legislation. To evaluate their modes of analysis, theorists can examine
the history of symbols in tax legislation.
C. Identifying Goals
Tax theorists traditionally reject popular opinion as simply mis-
guided. They attribute popular resistance to the estate tax to a wide-
spread fantasy of "striking it rich" by winning the lottery or by
inheriting from an unknown relative.241 Apparently, most people irra-
238 See text accompanying notes 334-43 (describing influence of concentration of wealth
symbol upon legislation from 1916 to 1935); text accompanying notes 357-60 (describing
influence of family business symbol upon legislation in 1976, 1980 and 1981).
239 See, e.g., Estate of Snyder v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529 (1989) (preferred stock
freeze of a corporation with assets consisting of publicly traded stock).
240 The metaphor of translation receives considerable attention in cultural studies. See,
e.g., Beyond Boundaries: Understanding, Translation and Anthropological Discourse
(Gfsli PIsson ed., 1993); Translation, History and Culture (Susan Bassnett & Andrd Le-
fevre eds., 1990).
241 See Ronald Chester, Inheritance, Wealth and Society 51 (1982) (noting strong desire
of majority of Americans to have a chance to "win big" by inheriting wealth); Okun, note
78, at 48-49 (attributing resistance to the possibility of "making it big"); Mark L. Ascher,
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 69, 119 (1990) ("Americans seem attached
not only to buying tickets in state lotteries and watching television game shows, but also to
dreaming about 'rich uncles' whose imminent death will make them instant millionaires.");
Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 285:
The most puzzling political obstacle to estate tax revision, however, is that the
American people do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests.... The only
convincing explanation that has occurred to me for this phenomenon lies in the
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tionally believe that they will someday be wealthy enough to worry
about the transfer tax. Public resistance to transfer taxation, however,
may be rooted not in irrational hopes but in value preferences. Re-
gardless of their own prospects for accumulating wealth, people har-
bor substantial misgivings about estate taxation. The widespread
appeal of the family business symbol is persuasive evidence that resist-
ance to the estate tax is rooted largely in normative understandings.
Not working in such businesses themselves, most Americans support
family businesses for reasons beyond personal self interest.2 42 The
family business symbol taps into deeply held values.
Extraction of specific policy goals from popular symbols requires a
deeper theory of cognition than those currently employed in tax the-
ory, 43 most of which emphasize only the errors in human reason-
ing. 44 One such account emphasizes the experiential foundation of
language. Symbols persuade by drawing upon the audience's prior ex-
perience.2 45 This experience is sedimented 246 in cognitive models.2 47
optimism of the American people. In California, at least, sixty-four percent of
the people [who voted to repeal the state's inheritance tax] must believe that
they will be in the wealthiest five to ten percent when they die.
McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 2, at 328 n. 170 (noting that opposition to gift and estate
taxes derives from ordinary citizen's belief that she might inherit money).
242 Cf. Gary R. Orren, Beyond Self-Interest, in Public Ideas, note 228, at 25 (reviewing
evidence that people's attitudes towards economic policy are shaped more by their beliefs
about the national economy than by their personal financial situation).
243 See McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, note 12, at 1943-45 (identifying need for deeper
theory of cognition in tax theory).
24See id.; Shaviro, note 137, at 46-48 (discussion of cognitive bias in tax law).
24s See Stone, note 13, at 123 ("Symbols call forth individual imagination, wish, and
experience, and draw the observer into the work of art as an active participant."); Winter,
Cognitive Dimension, note 231, at 2278 (describing "the role that experience and projec-
tion play in communication and intersubjective meaning").
246 Symbols and stories can be understood as having a sedimented social meaning. See
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 129-30 (1962) ("[There is a 'world
of thoughts', or a sediment left by our mental processes, which enables us to rely on our
concepts and acquired judgments as we might on things there in front of us... without
there being any need for us to resynthesize them."); see also Winter, Indeterminacy, note
161, at 1488:
Sedimentation is the 'deposit' of the subject's past interactions with its physical
and social situation. It operates as a gestalt that, once integrated, can be in-
voked without being fully reactivated. Once a meaning is sedimented, it can
become self-reinforcing.... Because many subjects are situated in the same
environment, social experiences such as routine or habitual interactions be-
tween subjects give rise to mutual or reciprocal sedimentations.
247 These sometimes are referred to as idealized cognitive models, because they do not
perfectly fit actual lived situations. See Steven J. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Meta-
phoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 1105, 1152-53
(1989); see generally Thomas C. Daddesio, On Minds and Symbols: The Relevance of
Cognitive Science for Semiotics 103-23 (1995) (applying cognitive science to symbols);
Bipin Indurkhya, Metaphor and Cognition: An Interactionist Approach (1992) (discussion
of cognitive networks); Lakoff, note 236, at 68-154.
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The family business symbol draws upon two such models-"busi-
ness" and "family"-the story of the founder and the basic social unit.
These models, in turn, suggest the importance of the goals of reward
and community. Although perhaps less universal and quantifiable
than existing tax policy goals, these norms feed into the larger, public
discussion. Representing an honest effort to grapple with society's ex-
pressed preferences, they deserve overt consideration in tax policy
analysis. Mere discussion of them could radically alter current tax
theory. The following account initiates this discussion.
1. Reward
The cognitive model "business" suggests that tax theorists should
consider desert or reward, a return given for merit.24 3 Most Ameri-
cans share the "American Dream," in which virtue and hard work
lead to economic independence. The family business symbol per-
suades because it affirms this aspiration. Indeed, the family business
is perhaps the prototypical American Dream, with a lineage traceable
to the 18th century yeoman farmer and his successor, the 19th century
small businessman.249
Current tax policy norms of fairness and efficiency fail to capture
the idea of reward.2 0 Reward authorizes inequality, notwithstanding
the diminishing marginal utility of money. Permitting returns that are
economically inefficient,251 reward looks to the taxpayer's praisewor-
thiness rather than her contribution to gross national product. 252
Recognition of reward would prompt theorists to reconsider which
effects of inheritance taxation are most troubling. Tax policy currently
focuses on the impact on savings and, sometimes, innovation. 2-3 In
contrast, the public discourse shows the greatest concern for the effect
on work incentives.254 The persuasive power of the story draws from
248 See Scott Gordon, Welfare, Justice, and Freedom 94-99 (1980) (desert as criterion
for justice); Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 119-62; Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Complete
Idea of Justice, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 752, 764-70 (1984) (description of desert).
249 See text accompanying notes 298-303.
2M See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 119 ("The idea of reward .. is the most
neglected ethical idea in public finance.") (emphasis in original).
251 See id. at 121-23 (distinguishing a reward from an incentive).
m See id. at 123-24.
253 See text accompanying notes 74-75.
254 The family business is nothing other than the hard work of its founder, see Horsey
Statement, note 199, at 308 ("The transfer of a successful family-owned business looks like
the transfer of wealth on paper, but in the end, it is nothing more than the transfer of the
original sweat equity."), and the curse of concentration of wealth is that it encourages
laziness, see Carnegie, note 167, at 50 ("[T]he parent who leaves his son enormous wealth
generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to lead a less useful
and less worthy life than he otherwise would."); see also John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations
661 (1980) ("Genius is one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration.")
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the hard work that identifies the founder with the populace rather
than the savings and innovation that differentiate him. Americans tra-
ditionally believe that wealth derived from labor is worthier than that
derived from capital25 5
Recognition of reward also would encourage empirical examination
of how the transferor accumulated her wealth. The reward norm re-
gards wealth differently depending on its source: Wealth derived from
effort is most praiseworthy; wealth from savings, less so; wealth de-
rived from luck, the least.256 Arguments over the merits of inheri-
tance taxation often turn on the source of wealth.2-
Finally, recognition of reward would influence discussion of tax de-
sign. Serious consideration of reward raises the question of how to
structure taxes to reward praiseworthy behavior. Reward provides a
basis for favoring earned income under the income tax-58 and for tax-
ing wealth inherited by the decedent more heavily than wealth earned
by him.259 Through use of the reward norm, tax theory could shed
light upon whether such schemes actually further the American
Dream.260
2. Community
The cognitive model "family" suggests that tax theorists should con-
sider community as a normative goal. Americans value community,6 1
(quoting Thomas A. Edison); Robin M. Williams, Jr., American Society. A Sociological
Interpretation 458 (3d ed. 1970) ("In the United States is to be found what is almost the
ideal type of culture that stresses activity, it is no accident that the business so characteris-
tic of the culture can also be spelled 'busyness."').
255 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money. American Attitudes Toward
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 Ind. L.. 119, 128 (1994) [hereinafter Morality] (noting that
under the American tradition, "earned income is morally distinguishable from (and supe-
rior to) unearned income").
256 See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 126-31. Presumably, wealth derived from
theft is even less deserving.
w Thus, many proponents of inheritance taxation argue that wealth is attributable to
luck. See David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 Can. J.
Law & Jur. 3, 52-57 (1993); Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 275-76 (noting that much wealth is
attributable to luck).
258 For examples of such treatment in the current Code, see IRC § 32 (earned income
credit), § 911 (exclusion of foreign earned income). The passive loss rules limit losses from
unearned income. See IRC § 469.
259 This proposal was first made by Eugenio Rignano, The Social Significance of the
Inheritance Tax (Vlliam J. Shultz trans., 1924). For recent discussions of Rignano's
scheme, see Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 157-59; John K. McNulty, Fundamental
Alternatives to Present Transfer Tax Systems, in Death, Taxes and Family Property, note
74, at 85, 87-89.
2w See Chester, note 241, at 71 (noting that Rignano plans would benefit American
"Horatio Algers").
261 See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107
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particularly as institutionalized in the family.262 Reacting to the insta-
bility borne of geographic and occupational mobility,263 middle class
Americans strive to recreate community in family biographies264 and
genealogies. 265 The family business symbol plays upon this deep long-
ing to be rooted in place and time. Middle class Americans project
their aspirations upon rich families.266
The community norm receives little attention in tax theory.267 In-
deed, communitarianism 268 only recently has received attention in
Harv. L. Rev. 1463, 1469 (1994) (describing "the 'American Dream' of strong communities
and financial independence [as] an essential part of our culture and politics").
262 See John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in Changing
Images of the Family 43 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) (describing Amer-
ican images of the family as a community, as a refuge from the outside world, and as a
source of personal growth); Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost Further Explored 4
(1984) (describing modem tendency to view social roles prior to the industrial revolution
as "all highly symbolic and highly satisfying... everyone belonged in a group, a family
group. Everyone had his or her circle of affection: every relationship could be seen as a
love-relationship.").
263 See Allan Carlson, From Cottage to Work Station: The Family's Search for Social
Harmony in the Industrial Age 1-2 (1993) ("For over a millennium .... [r]esidence and
workplace were normally one and the same... Household production .. bound each
family together as a basic economic unit, a 'community of work.' Industrialization tore
asunder this settled, family-oriented European world."); Williams, note 254, at 58-59
(describing how geographic and social mobility weaken the American extended family).
264 See Bernard Farber, Kinship and Class: A Midwestern Study 107-08 (1971):
Perhaps one of the reasons that the symbolic family estate has maintained its
importance is that the family is one of the few ascriptive groups to which the
individuals in modem society belong. They can shift occupations easily, mi-
grate from one region to another, or move from one house to another, but they
cannot deny their family of orientation .... In contemporary society, there-
fore, biography may become an important mechanism for sustaining identity
within a kinship group and, through this identity, a basis for establishing status
and a sense of belonging.
265 See Williams, note 254, at 58 ("A thriving business is done in ferreting out genealo-
gies, tracing descent from notable persons, discovering (or inventing) coats of arms, and so
on. One does not need a specialized search for traditions, genealogies and symbols where
these things are part of actual family life.").
6 See George E. Marcus, Lives in Trust: The Fortunes of Dynastic Families in Late
Twentieth-Century America 89-90 (1992):
[T]he story of rise from obscurity and dynastic hopes for the future... speaks
... strongly to certain aspirations and fantasies of middle-class thought ....
Dynastic sagas.., play out these hopes in a way that at least would be realistic
for people in middle-class situations to imagine-the self-made person or
couple keeping the family together well into the children's adulthood and per-
haps beyond.
267 For a rare exception, see Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progres-
sive Income Tax Movement: A 3ypical Male Reaction, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 505 (1987)
[hereinafter Rhetoric] (appeal to communitarianism in tax policy analysis).
2M8 Communitarianism generally is defined by contrast to liberalism, which posits indi-
vidual welfare as the ultimate good. See Taibi, note 261, at 1469 ("Liberal perspectives do
not treat building community institutions as an end in itself.").
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political theory, 69 and has yet to spread to mainstream economics.3' 0
Tax theorists do discuss the family, but avoid talking about communal
values. Some sidestep overt normative discussion entirely by striving
for rules that are "neutral"271 or conform to existing social prac-
tices.272 Even theorists discussing normative issues generally confine
themselves to efficiency and other liberal norms.2
Recognition of the community norm would allow theorists to help
clarify diverse2 74 and potentially conflicting2 75 visions of society. It
also would lead to a discussion of whether modifying the tax system
advances that ideal. Extended families are largely a product of wealth
itself.276 Protecting them may do little to nourish middle class
community.277
Recognition of community as a norm also would alter discussions of
tax design. Use of that norm facilitates discussion of proposals to re-
duce transfer taxes on properties that represent community, such as
269 See generally Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982); Michael
Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 Pol. Theory 6 (1990).
270 See Taibi, note 261, at 1469 ("Although the 'American Dream' of strong communi-
ties and financial independence remains an essential part of our culture and politics, the
idea that the purpose of economic policy should be to promote this dream has not enjoyed
intellectual respectability since the downfall of the Populist movement in the late nine-
teenth century.").
271 See Boris L Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L Rev. 1389,
1395 (1975); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Compre-
hensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 Harv. L Rev. 1573 (1977).
2n See, e.g., Marjorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income Shar-
ing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 Hastings LJ. 63, 65-79 (1993); Lawrence
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339, 342 (1994).
273 Professor McCaffery, for one, asks whether preferential treatment of particular fam-
ily structures promotes social welfare by adjusting for labor elasticities or market failure, as
well as whether such treatment would promote liberal ideals such as the right to choose
among family structures or the elimination of gender discrimination. See Edward J. Mc-
Caffery, Taxation and the Family. A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code,
40 UCLA L. Rev. 983,1035-58 (1993). But see Duff, note 257, at 50-62 (arguing for plural-
istic and egalitarian concept of the family in tax theory).
274 See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 685,719-32 (1992) (describing theories of substantive community underlying
communitarianism).
275 For example, families are sometimes in tension with other communities. A close knit
family may divide a local community and a strong local community can intrude upon
families.
276 See Allen, note 171, at 93 (noting that "members of wealthy capitalist families often
possess a sense of family identity and an awareness of kinship ties that... is attributable to
the fact that these families control large fortunes"); E. Digby Baltzell, Puritan Boston and
Quaker Philadelphia 207 (1980) (describing wealth as the "fertilizer of family trees"); Mau-
rice Zeitlin, Lynda Ann Ewen & Richard Earl Ratcliff, "New Princes" for Old? Large
Corporations and the Capitalist Class in Chile, 80 Am. J. Soc. 87, 109 (1974) (describing
wealthy family as "a complex kinship unit in which economic interests and kinship bonds
are inextricably intertwined").
277 See Allen, note 171, at 8-9 (noting that for most Americans, "family" corresponds to
nuclear family).
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family heirlooms or mementoes, or that physically bring people to-
gether, such as a family residence or small business. 278 Reliance on
communal norms also affects understanding of proposals to reduce
transfer taxes within the family. The transfer tax has long reduced
taxes on transfers to spouses279 and there have been occasional pro-
posals to extend preferential treatment to other family members,
280
perhaps varying according to the beneficiaries' age.281
3. Conclusion
Recognition of reward and community in policy analysis would nar-
row the gap between tax theory and the public discourse, thereby po-
tentially changing both theorist and public attitudes.
Acknowledgement of these goals might erode the theorist consensus
for wealth taxation. Rational analysis of them might reduce the ap-
peal of the family business symbol.
Such recognition also could alter the estate tax. Enactment of pro-
posals directly tailored to reward and community might reduce the
demand for rules accommodating the family business. Decreased reli-
ance on this fuzzy concept would permit a closer fit between goal and
rule. Similar transactions would receive more uniform treatment and
taxpayers would find it more difficult to obtain a particular tax conse-
quence by adopting a mere form.
D. Evaluating Modes of Analysis
Theorists can use the public discourse not only to find neglected tax
policy goals, but also to evaluate existing modes of analysis. The pub-
lie understands policy analysis by reference to cultural archetypes.
Consequently, the appeal of an analytical mode depends upon its rela-
tionship to the archetypes and upon the strength and scope of the ar-
chetypes in the public eye.
278 The reduced taxation could be conditioned upon the assets continuing to perform a
communal function. Cf. IRC § 2032A(c) (requiring recapture of benefit of special use val-
uation if family member sells or fails to materially participate in the business); Reg.
§ 25.2702-5(c)(5) (exempting certain trusts from § 2702 only so long as trust is used as
personal residence of grantor).
279 See IRC §§ 2056, 2523 (deductions against estate and gift taxes for property passing
to spouses).
280 See Osgood Statement, note 173, at 280 (arguing for heavier taxes on legacies to "a
blood stranger").
281 In 1976, Congress enacted a deduction for amounts passing to a minor orphan, see
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2057(a), (c), 90 Stat. 1520, 1890-91, which
was repealed five years later, see Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 427(a), 95 Stat. 172, 318.
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One means of ascertaining the relative importance of the arche-
types is by examining the history of archetypes in transfer tax legisla-
tion.38 To profit from this examination, one need not assume that
archetypes are the most important determinant of legislative suc-
cess,w or that the symbols that prevail in legislation necessarily com-
mand the greatest support among the public at large.2 4 All that is
necessary is a recognition that archetypes do play a role in legislation
and a desire to address the legislature.
The history of archetypes in tax legislation suggests that pragmatic
wealth tax policy has substantial shortcomings. The comprehensive
tax base ideal enjoys less popular support than theorists assume, and
the appeal of ability to pay, though greater, is diminishing. Benefit, by
contrast, resonates deeply with popular understandings.
These conclusions run counter to longstanding theorist assumptions.
In discussing wealth and income taxes, theorists conventionally rele-
gate benefit, and (to a lesser extent) ability to pay to bygone, less sci-
entific, eras.38 They associate benefit with the rise of 18th century
parliamentary democracy, 6 and ability to pay, with 19th century class
confict.287 Theorists believe that both approaches lost favor because
2K2 For summaries of the history of the transfer tax, see Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C.
Blakey, The Federal Income Tax (1940); Randolph E. Paul, Taxation in the United States
(1954); Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America (1967); Witte, Politics, note 70,
Eisenstein, note 174, at 224-38; C. Lowell Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxa-
tion, 18 Taxes 531 (1940); David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the
fransfer of Wealth, 19 N'jllamette L. Rev. 1, 9-32 (1983).
= Political actors no doubt often use symbols in order to rally public opinion. Never-
theless, the symbols have an independent content that affects legislation. See text accom-
panying notes 207-213.
284 Filtered through institutions, the public discourse reflects biases in group formation.
It is likely that the difficulty of organizing diffuse interests diverts attention away from the
threat of concentrations of wealth and toward the plight of the family business, and distorts
the size of government. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Mater-
ials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 55-56 (1988) (discussing
effect of group formation on size of government). Thus, the historical account below is not
the complete story of American attitudes towards wealth. It traces only the beliefs that
ultimately prevailed in the legislative process.
285 Relatively little has been written on the history of tax policy. See Kiesling, Public
Goods, note 17, at 30 (noting that "very little systematic inquiry into the history of tax
[policy] analysis has been carried out since Seligman's monumental efforts around the turn
of this century").
2 See id. at 32; see also Harold M. Groves, Tax Philosophers 29 (1974) (describing
dominance of benefit theory in the tax literature prior to John Stuart Mill); William J.
Schultz, The Taxation of Inheritance 179-83 (1926) (describing the quid pro quo doctrines
of estate taxation as the oldest); Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Ben-
efit Taxation: Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. Leg. Stud. 201
(1983).
2w See Witte, Politics, note 70, at 32 ("As issues of equality exploded in the industrial-
ized world of the nineteenth century, there was a parallel expansion in theories of income
taxation."); Neil H. Jacoby, Guidelines for Tax Reform in the 1960's, 1 Tax Rev. Comp.,
Ways & Means Comm., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 157, 159 (1959) ("During the 19th and early
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they were needlessly subjective. 288 In contrast, the comprehensive tax
base fits the modern welfare state,28 9 and provides essential
objectivity.
The conclusions of this Article are not reactionary so much as they
are democratic. They do not turn back the clock so much as they
make the discussion more accessible to society at large. Professor
Simons' "peculiarly narrow"' 29° approach is that of highly specialized
tax professionals. By contrast, ability to pay theory was championed
20th centuries economic thought about the appropriate guidelines of taxation became in-
creasingly preoccupied with the problem of equity in the distribution of the tax burden
among individuals.").
288 Eighteenth century writers divided over measuring benefit. See Kiesling, Public
Goods, note 17, at 32 (discussing different applications of benefit theory to income tax);
Max West, The Inheritance Tax 201-03 (1908) (describing partnership, value of service and
cost of service theories for estate taxation). John Stuart Mill is credited with discrediting
inquiry into benefit. See Groves, note 286, at 29; Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 33-35;
see also 2 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 805 (W. Ashley ed., Longmans
Green 1926) (1848):
The practice of setting definite values on things essentially indefinite and mak-
ing them a ground of practical conclusions, is particularly fertile in false views
of social questions.... Government must be regarded as so pre-eminently a
concern of all, that to determine who are most interested in it is of no real
importance.
Nineteenth century writers differed over whether ability to pay mandated minimizing total
sacrifice or equalizing sacrifice among taxpayers. Compare F.Y. Edgeworth, Minimum
Sacrifice Versus Equal Sacrifice, in 2 Papers Relating to Political Economy 239-40 (1925)
(arguing that minimum sacrifice maximizes social utility) with Mill, supra, at 805 ("As a
government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their
claim on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as
possible with the same pressure upon all.").
Moreover, depending on one's assumptions about utility, equal sacrifice might require
regressive, proportional or progressive rates. See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 43-45;
Witte, Politics, note 70, at 33-34. 'Twentieth century writers are generally skeptical of this
utilitarian analysis. See Groves, note 286, at 5-15; Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 34;
Blum & Kalven, Progressive Taxation, note 5, at 465-71.
289 Arguably, the modem welfare state presumes broad, progressive taxes. See Witte,
Politics, note 70, at 154. See Witte, supra note 70, at 154 ("It is not coincidental that it was
also during [the period of a growing federal government] that debates over the classical
prescriptive theories were replaced by analysis of the proper structure of the tax code,
which meant consideration of the work of Henry Simons. By the 1960s interest in Simon's
work had reached a point where actions began to be taken in his name and 'tax reform'
efforts were guided by his tax base standard.").
290 Utz, note 85, at 12.
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by economists conversant with politics,29' and benefit theory was fa-
vored by writers with broad understandings of society.292
1. Comprehensive Tax Base
Theorists view the comprehensive tax base ideal as a weapon for
beating back organized interests. 93 Its effectiveness depends upon
popular stories and symbols. It persuades by equating deviations from
a comprehensive tax base with wasted expenditures 94 and tax breaks
for the wealthy.295
This equation presumes popular consensus for a broad-based, pro-
gressive tax that redistributes property widely within the middle class.
The history of archetypes in legislation casts doubt upon this assump-
tion.296 That history reveals clear support only for taxes on the upper
crust of society. More often than not, Congress has regarded the fam-
ily business as the social norm and concentration of wealth as the
exception.
This pattern first emerged prior to the Civil War. A product of the
Protestant "work and savings ethic,1297 the family business exempli-
fied the American Dream. At the time of the revolution, the family
291 Ability to pay theory flourished when political economy was just emerging as a pro-
fession. See John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics in Perspective: A Critical History 89
(1987) (during the last three quarters of the 19th century, economics "ceased to be a sub-
ject for contemplation and discussion by people who were otherwise employed and became
instead a profession"). John Stuart Mill, for example, wrote on economics only in his spare
time while employed by the British East India Company. See Charles E. Staley, A History
of Economic Thought: From Aristotle to Arrow 109 (1989).
292 See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 32 (describing views of Grotius, Pufendorf,
Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith).
293 See Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L Rev.
1267, 1317-18 (noting that tax expenditure concept requires Congress to go public with
what might be an unpopular concession to a narrow interest group); Musgrave, Defense,
note 72, at 50 ("loophole pressures are difficult to meet without reference to a basic in-
come concept").
294 See McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, note 12, at 1941-42 (noting that tax expenditure
analysis characterizes deviations from norm as needless government spending).
295 See generally Boris L Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71
Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1112-14 (1973) (describing populist uses of comprehensive tax
terminology).
296 This conclusion is also supported by public opinion polls. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum &
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case For Progressive Taxation x (1963) ("Except for a rela-
tively small elite, the very notion of a progressive tax proved beyond grasp.") (emphasis in
original); id. at xi ("T]he public, unlike a few intellectuals, virtually never thinks of the
progressive tax as an instrument for reducing economic inequality.").
297 Edward J. MeCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 Tex.
L. Rev. 1145, 1162-63 (1992) [hereinafter Hybrid]; see Max Weber, "The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism 170-72 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1st Am. ed. 1930) (1905) (Prot-
estant asceticism combined acquisitive activity with limitation on consumption).
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business generally took the form of the family farm.298 The yeoman
farmer ideally combined frugality, honesty, piety and hard work,2 9 9
with self sufficiency and economic independence. 300 In the early 19th
century, the family business ideal extended301 to small scale industry
occurring in the home or workshop, as success in industry was
ascribed to agrarian values.302 Thus, the agrarian ideal of the family
farm and the small business typified American life.30 3
During the antebellum period, legislators regarded concentrations
of wealth as exceptions. Discrete obstacles to the American Dream,
they could be broken apart with minor reforms. After the revolution,
the chief threat to the yeoman's dream was the landed gentry, succes-
sors of the English aristocracy. Legislatures addressed this menace by
eradicating "feudal relics," most notably primogeniture and entail. 3o4
298 Unlike the European peasant, the American farmer owned his own land, a commod-
ity in its own right, see, e.g., James Oliver Robertson, America's Business 25-30 (1985), and
produced for market, id. 23-25; see also Mansel G. Blackford, A History of Small Business
in America 12 (1991).
299 See James Mickel Williams, Our Rural Heritage 83 (1925) ("The early farmer was,
above everything else, a mighty worker... There was no place in rural life for men who
could not work.")
300 See generally Rex Bums, Success in America: The Yeoman Dream and the Indus-
trial Revolution 1 (1976) (describing yeoman's virtues as "competence, independence and
morality, [i.e.,] wealth somewhat beyond one's basis needs, freedom from economic or
statutory subservience, and the respect of the society for fruitful, honest industry.").
301 See, e.g., John H. Bunzel, The American Small Businessman 19 (1962).
302 See Williams, note 299, at 229:
The fanner maintained that any man of enterprise could take up land and be-
come an independent producer .... Now many of the early manufacturers
were also farmers or had been farmers before they became manufacturers....
These manufacturers maintained that any man of enterprise could save money,
borrow what more he needed and start in manufacturing.
Cf. John G. Cawelti, Apostles of the Self-Made Man 47 (1968) ("[T]he primary function of
... self-improvement handbook[s] [in the age of Jackson and Lincoln] was not so much to
guide behavior as to explain the dynamic changes of American life in terms of badly
shaken traditional verities.").
For employees, economic independence was deferred, but equality of opportunity and
upward mobility assured that it would come. See Daniel T. Rogers, The Work Ethic In
Industrial America 1850-1920, at 35 (1978); Bums, note 300, at 91-127 (describing hopes of
mechanics for the yeoman dream).
303 See, e.g., Peter d'A. Jones, The Consumer Society: A History of American Capital-
ism 110 (1965) ("Rural Americans idealized the small entrepreneur: the family farm, the
independent business, the modest partnership. Theirs was a homely image, fired in the
small-town forge and hammered out on the frontier. It was the ideal of a farming and
trading people."); Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in
The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 188, 196 (1965) ("From its colo-
nial beginnings through most of the nineteenth century, ours was overwhelmingly a nation
of farmers and small-town entrepreneurs .... ).
304 See, e.g., Gustavus Myers, The Ending of Hereditary American Fortunes 11-18
(1939); John V. Orth, After the Revolution: "Reform" of the Law of Inheritance, 10 L. &
Hist. Rev. 33, 33-36 (1992). Other reforms included elimination of titles and confiscation
of royalist estates. See Jones, note 303, at 32-33. Abolition of primogeniture and entail
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In the early 19th century, the danger was governmentally sanctioned,
special privilege, such as the Bank of the United States,305 and the
response was general incorporation statutes.3
After the Civil War, the belief that concentrations of wealth repre-
sented discrete obstacles molded the transfer tax. When enacted, the
estate tax was a modest response toward the threat of big business.30
7
Thereafter, the estate and gift tax applied only to a small percentage
of the population.308 The transfer tax legislation of the last 50 years
has only reaffirmed the initial vision. The most important changes in
the tax were increases in the exemption amount in 1976 and 1981-
adjustments for inflation that limited the tax to a relatively few large
concentrations of wealth3o9 During that period, pragmatic transfer
tax reform foundered. Treasury proposals failed to spur congressional
action in 1950,310 1969311 and 1985.312
Admittedly, pragmatic income tax reform has fared better, initiat-
ing legislation in 1969313 and 1986.314 This success is attributable to
the deeply entrenched social practices supporting the income tax. A
low exemption and wage withholding make the income tax a promi-
nent part of everyday life, against which pragmatists credibly can
had little effect. See Orth, supra, at 42 ("'reform' of the law of inheritance, so long as it
stopped short of placing legal limits on the size of estates or denying freedom of testations
was largely irrelevant compared to social custom and individual interest.").
305 See Hofstadter, note 303, at 196 (describing assault on the Bank of the United States
as part of American belief in decentralized economic and political power).
306 See Rowland Berthoff, Independence and Enterprise: Small Business in the Ameri-
can Dream, in Small Business in American Life 28,34 (Stuart W. Bruchey ed., 1980) ("By
the 1850's, the passage of state laws for granting general charters... helped reassure any
remaining doubters that the business corporation represented not privilege but equal
freedom.").
307 Cf. Robert Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order Origins of the
Federal Income Tax 1861-1913, at 15-58 (1993) (arguing that federal income tax was
designed more to quell dissent than to redistribute wealth).
303 See Proposals, note 7, at 39 (stating that in 1940, estate tax returns filed by 1% of
decedents); Kathy Medve, Estate Tax Returns Revisited, 1916-1931, SOI Bull., Spring
1987, at 59, 60 (noting that estate tax returns from 1916 to 1931 never exceeded more than
1.4 % of total U.S. deaths).
309 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 124 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 412,460 (justify-
ing increased exemption by reference to concentrations of wealth); H.R. Rep. No. 97-201,
at 154,156 (1981), reprinted in 1981-2 CB. 352,376 (noting that the purpose of the exemp-
tion was to exempt small and moderately sized estates); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Estate
and Gift Tax Changes of 1981: A Brief Essay on Historical Perspective, 60 N.C. L Rev.
821, 830 (1982) ("By focusing the federal estate and gift levies upon a wealthier, more
restricted economic elite, the Ninety-seventh Congress ... has defined the future of the
federal transfer taxes in essentially populist terms, that is, the propriety of large inheri-
tances in a democratic society.").
310 See Witte, Politics, note 70, at 137.
311 See Surrey & Kurtz, note 2.
312 See Treasury I, note 30.
313 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
314 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2035.
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equate deviations from a comprehensive tax base with tax breaks for
the wealthy. The low visibility of the estate tax makes it difficult to
generate moral outrage over gaps in its base. A charge of "loopholes"
rings hollow in a tax that deliberately excludes 98% of the population.
Pragmatists often attempt to draw upon existing practices by tying
wealth taxation more closely to the income tax. They claim that the
transfer tax "backstops" the income tax, filling gaps in that tax's
base.315 They also propose treating inherited wealth more like in-
come, by including gifts and bequests in income,316 or taxing unreal-
ized capital gains at death,317 or taxing accessions to wealth. 318 All
these proposals reduce the incentive to freeze estates.
It remains to be seen whether appeals to income taxation can
broaden the historically narrow view of inheritance taxation. Thus far
they have not. This was demonstrated most recently in the carryover
basis legislation of the late 1970's, during which appeals to the family
business symbol successfully galvanized support against proposals tax-
ing appreciation passing at death.319 Claims that death taxes sabotage
the American Dream carry great weight, even in the income tax
context.
315 See Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1191. This backstop argument is also implicit in
the pragmatic argument that the estate tax is necessary to preserve progressivity among
income classes. See Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 272-73.
316 See Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1978); McNulty, note 259, at 95.
317 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 361 (1993).
318 See McNulty, note 259, at 90.
319 See Winter Statement, note 175, at 340 (Capital gains at death could "amount to a
tax on the invested work of the owners" of closely held corporations and could force them
to sell out to larger corporations.); 1976 Hearings, note 175, at 403 (additional statement of
William C. McCamant, Nat'l Ass'n of Wholesaler-Distribs.) (Capital gains on assets trans-
ferred at death "would sound the death knell for small businesses."). Later it also was
invoked in the successful campaign to repeal the carryover basis provision enacted that
year. See Estate and Gift Tax Problems Arising from the Tax Reform Act of 1976: Hear-
ing before the Subcom. on Tax and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 95th Cong. 151 (1977) (joint statement of Nat'l Livestock Tax Comm., Am. Nat'l
Cattlemen's Ass'n, Nat'l Livestock Feeders Ass'n & Nat'! Wool Growers Ass'n) ("Many
family farm and ranch operations may not be able to pay [the added tax attributable to
carryover basis] without liquidating the business."); Technical Corrections Act of 1977 (In-
cluding Carryover Basis Provisions): Hearing before the Subcom. on Tax and Debt Man-
agement Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 272 (1977) (statement of
L. Keville Larson, Forest Indus. Comm.) ("Ironically it is the persons that [the 1976] revi-
sions in estate tax laws were designed to assist-surviving spouses, farmers and small busi-
nessmen and persons with small estates-who suffer most from the 'incidental' adverse
effects of the carryover basis provision."); see also Hoffman, note 123, at 444 (describing
role of small businesses and family farms in the repeal of carryover basis).
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2. Ability to Pay
The weakness of the comprehensive tax base ideal as a justification
for inheritance taxation has inspired greater interest in ability to pay.
Professors Ascher and Duff have revived ability to pay theories320 by
emphasizing the role of estate taxation in wealth redistribution 21
Professor Ascher builds his case squarely on the need to curtail inheri-
tance,322 and Professor Duff explicitly rejects traditional tax principles
in favor of distributive justice.32 In contrast to the pragmatists,
Professors Ascher and Duff defend an exceptional transfer tax, apply-
ing high rates to a few.324 They recognize concentrations of wealth as
narrow exceptions to the American Dream.
The history of tax legislation indicates that appeal to redistribution
has substantial but diminishing power. Such appeal plays upon fears
of big business that underlay enactment of the estate tax but that have
waned over time. In the last 120 years, changes in mainstream por-
trayals of big business325 have inspired three overlapping phases in
estate taxation. During the first, the threat represented by big busi-
ness stories captured legislative attention. During the second, de-
creased antagonism between big business and the American Dream
dampened enthusiasm for estate taxation. During the third, the grow-
ing prevalence of big business values eroded the transfer tax. Each
phase reflects long-term social and institutional changes.
From the 1870's to the 1930's, big business stories were widely re-
garded as threatening popular aspirations.326 The growth of big busi-
ness in the late 19th century327 inspired increasingly materialisticn s
and competitive329 success stories. Horrified by them,330 critics rallied
320 Ability to pay theorists justified the estate tax as diluting wealth or as abolishing
inheritance altogether. See Schultz, note 286, at 193-95 (describing diffusion of wealth ar-
gument for estate tax); West, note 288, at 200-01 (same).
321 See Ascher, note 241, at 99 (quoting Andrew Carnegie); Duff, note 257, at 20 (citing
Roosevelts).
322 See Ascher, note 241, at 76-112.
323 See Duff, note 257, at 4-18.
324 See Aseher, note 241, at 132-35; Duff, note 257, at 27-28.
325 The portrayals described here are drawn from mainstream newspapers, magazines,
academic works and books. "Fringe" sources might well offer a different perspective.
3M See Hofstadter, note 303, at 197 (describing American apprehension at concentration
of wealth in the last third of the 19th century).
327 See id. at 196 (In the last three decades of the 19th century, the small enterprise
economy was "overwhelmed by the giant corporation.").
32 See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise
12-13 (1951) (describing business's appeal to materialism); Burns, note 300. at 167 ("By the
last third of the 19th century, the dominant concept of success was one of opulent material-
ism competitively won."); id. at 63 (describing increasing materialism and praise of compe-
tition in the 1830's and 1840's).
329 The old tradition of self-made men, a tradition that stressed industry, frugality, hon-
esty and piety gave way to a definition of success that was largely economic and "endorsed
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around the ideal of the small producer. Horatio Alger, for one, told
stories of men who embodied agrarian virtues and achieved modest
material success, such as junior partner in a small partnership.331 For
many Americans, the businessman ceased being a hero332 and became
a "robber baron. '333
During this stage, the threat of big business galvanized support 33
for social reform,335 including estate taxation. Grass roots movements
among labor,336 small business and agriculture agitated for the tax.337
The Socialist Labor Party, the Populist Party, the Progressive Party,
the Union Party and the Farmer-Labor Party, all adopted planks sup-
porting inheritance taxation in their national platforms.338 High pro-
such secular qualities as initiative, aggressiveness, competitiveness and forcefulness."
Cawelti, note 302, at 5; see also James 0. Robertson, American Myth, American Reality
180-82 (1980).
330 See William Miller, The Realm of Wealth in the Reconstruction of American History
142 (John Higham ed., 1962) ("[T]hese stories about my wealth... have a bad effect on a
class of people .. the stress which is laid in those stories arouses hatred and envy.")
(quoting John D. Rockefeller).
331 See Richard Weiss, The American Myth of Success 49, 59-60 (1969) (describing Al-
ger's nostalgic stories of agricultural society).
332 See Theodore P. Greene, America's Heroes: The Changing Models of Success in
American Magazines 276 (1970) (describing drop in popular esteem for businessmen in
1904-1913).
333 The robber baron concept began with the Greenbackers and Populists, see Hal
Bridges, The Robber Baron Concept in American History, 32 Bus. Hist. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1958),
and was adopted by contemporary observers, see Henry D. Lloyd, Wealth Against Com-
monwealth (1936). See also Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons (1934).
334 See W. Woodruff, History and the Businessman, 30 Bus. His. Rev. 241, 244 (1956)
("[Tihe businessman became the focal point of [a] movement of protest, the political side
of which was expressed through the Populist and later the Progressive Party.").
335 The Sherman Act was the most prominent attack on concentration. See Hofstadter,
note 303, at 205 ("In [one] respect, the Sherman Act was simply another manifestation of
an enduring American suspicion of concentrated power."); David Millon, The Sherman
Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219, 1220 (1988) (arguing that the Sher-
man Act was "a final effort of [a] longstanding, deeply rooted ideology... that aimed to
control political power through decentralization of economic power.").
336 See Gustavus Myers, The Ending of Hereditary American Fortunes 113 (1939) (not-
ing that George E. McNeill, one of the founders of the Knights of Labor, advocated taxing
"wealth out of being").
337 See Ratner, note 282, at 355 (In 1916, "[r]ecommendations for a federal inheritance
tax gained wide publicity and support from labor unions, small businessmen, and farm-
ers."). This alignment was similar to that of the income tax. See John D. Buenker, The
Income Tax and the Progressive Era 407-08 (1985) (describing efforts of interest groups on
behalf of income tax); Stanley, note 307, at 107 (describing advocation of income tax by
centrists as attempt to fend off the left); id. at 123 (describing petitions from farm and labor
groups). Besides Ratner, I have found no evidence on the position of small business with
respect to the estate tax. Divisions within the business community described by other his-
torians make Ratner's assertion plausible. See Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Re-
form: A Study of the Progressive Movement 10-15 (1962) (describing urban-small town,
east-west and small-large divisions in the business community during progressive era).
338 See National Party Platforms, 1840-1956, at 96 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce
Johnson eds., 1956) (Socialist Labor Platform of 1892); id. at 116 (People's (Fusion Fac-
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file politicians staked out positions on the transfer tax,339 which
enjoyed substantial legislative successes: enactment of the estate tax
in 1916,340 enactment of the gift tax in 1924,31 and large increases in
both in 193432 and 1935.
3
In the second stage, beginning in the 1930's and extending through
the 1960's, big business stories were portrayed as less threatening to
popular aspirations. Americans showed growing appreciation of big
business as a source of jobs and consumer goods.? Ordinary Ameri-
cans began to identify with the founder-manager of the big business
and to see in him their own aspirations for success through hard
work. 45 The search for middle class respectability merged with the
business mogul's drive to the top, as the import of the "Horatio Alger
Story" changed from an agrarian tale to the prototypical capitalist as-
cent from rags to riches.? Big Business produced heroes,3 7 like
tion) Platform of 1900); id. at 118 (People's (Middle-of-The-Road Faction) Platform of
1900); id. at 181 (Progressive Party Platform of 1912); id. at 254 (La Fallette's Platform of
1924); id. at 447 (Progressive Party Platform of 1948); id. at 375 (Union Party Platform of
1936); id. at 336 (Farmer-Labor Platform of the Campaign of 1936).
339 See text accompanying notes 162-67 (statements of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt,
Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt). Members of Congress also staked out positions
for the tax. A few stubborn congressmen fought to preserve the tax in 1924, see Eisenstein
note 282, at 232 & n.50, and Senators Couzens and LaFollette led the fight to strengthen
the tax in 1934, see Mark H. Leff, The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and
Taxation, 1933-1939, at 107 (1984).
34 See Revenue Act of 1916, cl. 463, § 200, 39 Stat. 756, 777.
341 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 321(a)(1), (3), 43 Stat. 253,314. The gift tax was
repealed in 1926 and re-enacted in 1932. See Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200(a), 44
Stat. 9, 125; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 88 501-32, 47 Stat. 169, 245.
342 See Revenue act of 1934, ch. 277, § 405, 48 Stat. 680. 754-55.
343 See Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, §§ 201(b), 301(b), 49 Stat. 1014, 1022, 1025.
344 See Hofstadter, note 303, at 212-15 (describing rise in the standard of living, accept-
ance of big business and the vanishing of the fears of the progressive era); id. at 223
(describing acceptance of bureaucratic corporate career by a majority of Americans);
Moses Rischin, The American Gospel of Success: Individualism and Beyond 5 (1965) ("In
the second half of the twentieth century, America has become inseparably wedded to the
terms of success and to the style of the giant corporations.").
35 See Sigmund Diamond, The Reputation of the American Businessman 178-79 (1955)
(noting shift in press coverage of entrepreneurs: early 19th century focus on unique busi-
ness qualities of businessman and use (not acquisition) of his wealth; 20th century focus on
his universal qualities, the enterprise he created, how he exemplified the virtues of Ameri-
can capitalism).
346 See Gary Scharnhorst & Jack Bales, The Lost Life of Horatio Alger, Jr. 149-56
(1985) (attributing transformation to the need to defend the "American Way of Life" dur-
ing World War I).
347 See Russell B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Ori-
gins and Development 1870-1950, at 321 (1951) ("The cycle had run from thorny old Com-
modore Vanderbilt to Rockefeller to Henry Ford, from admiration to hatred to faith. The
same public that hated Morgan and the elder Rockefeller made Henry Ford (a less able
man) into a national idol .... ").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1996]
Henry Ford and Thomas Edison,348 and even the Robber Barons mer-
ited rehabilitationY49
This change in attitude affected transfer tax legislation. Reduced
concern about the threat of concentration of wealth made that tax less
appealing to partisan interests. In the 1950's and 1960's, the estate
and gift taxes became the "neglected stepchildren of the Federal reve-
nue system.
' 350
In the third stage, beginning in the 1970's, values associated with big
business may even have become central to the American Dream.
Hoping to maintain standards of living in the midst of declining pro-
ductivity,351 Americans voiced greater concern about their material
well-being. Savings was severed from the work ethic, becoming an
independent value. Economists increasingly proposed replacing the
income tax with a consumption tax.3
52
This change in values influenced perception of small business.
Many now looked to small business for productivity and jobs formerly
associated with big business. 353 The entrepreneur became a hero,
354
34 See, e.g., Dixon Wecter, The Hero in America: A Chronicle of Hero-Worship 417-22
(1972); see also Marshall W. Fishwick, American Heroes: Myth and Reality 114-38 (1954)
(describing Ford as an American hero).
349 See Bridges, note 333, at 12 ("current trend in American historiography is away from
[the robber baron] concept"); Woodruff, note 334, at 245-48 (describing rehabilitation of
robber barons by American historians). One historian, Allan Nevins, explicitly defended
this reassessment by reference to the need to stop apologizing for "America's devotion to
material progress, its worship of bigness and its muscular economic power." Id. at 245.
350 Stanley S. Surrey, An Introduction to Revision of the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes,
38 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1950); see also Groves, note 286, at 151 ("Estate and gift taxes are the
area of the tax system which suffers from greatest neglect."); Adrian W. DeWind, The
Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 Cal. L. Rev. 79, 81 (1950)
(expressing concern that piecemeal attacks will cause "the estate and gift taxes [to] shrink
to the point at which their actual disappearance from the Federal revenue system will be
but a formality"); Eisenstein, note 282, at 255 ("The estate tax, I believe, is in a period of
decline.").
351 See Robert F. Hebert & Albert N. Link, The Entrepreneur: Mainstream Views &
Radical Critiques 3 (1988) ("The average annual rate of labor productivity growth in the
United States fell from 3.3 percent between 1948 and 1965, to 2.3 percent between 1965
and 1973, and again to 1.2 percent between 1973 and 1978.").
352 See Henry J. Aaron, Richer Means Harder to Tax, in Tax Policy in the Twenty-First
Century 232, 247 (Herbert Stein ed., 1988) ("A strong minority of philosophers and polit-
ical analysts and, perhaps, a majority of young economists have argued that consumption is
a fairer and less distorting base for an economy's major tax than is income."); Kornhauser,
Morality, note 255, at 164 n.222 (listing the "flurry of articles in the mid-to-late 1970's on
consumption taxes"); see also Paul V. Teplitz & Stephen H. Brooks, Alternative Tax Pro-
posals: How the Numbers Add Up 45 (1986) (describing growing economist interest in
consumption tax).
353 See State of Small Business: A Report of the President (1985); Blackford, note 298,
at xi (describing interest of historians, social scientists and business school faculty in small
business as likely source for economic rejuvenation).
354 See Elizabeth Ehrlich, America Expects Too Much from Its Entrepreneurial Heroes,
Bus. Wk., July 28, 1986, at 33. Disillusionment with government after the Vietnam War
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admired for his competitive attitude355 and productivity.3 5 6 This new
perception of small business reversed the relationship of transfer taxa-
tion and the agrarian ideal. The estate tax was now an attack on the
American Dream, not a means of preserving it.
In the third stage, the family business symbol dominated wealth tax
legislation. Organized groups used that symbol in battling congres-
sional staff and Treasury over the Tax Reform Act of 1976,35 the re-
peal of carryover basis in 1980358 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981.359 They persuaded Congress to enact savings incentives that
pushed the federal income tax closer to a consumption base. 6o
These legislative stages reflect long-term social and institutional
changes occurring over the 20th century. One change was increasing
occupational mobility.361 A growing middle class found concentra-
tions of wealth less threatening. Another change was the eclipse of
broad-based political movements by narrow commercial groups: Rad-
ical labor and populist movements lost steam32 and commercial
groups organized to beat back governmental regulation. These insti-
tutional changes radically altered the labor-small business-farm coali-
tion.3 3 The volunteeristic American Federation of Labor succeeded
the radical Knights of Labor as the representative of the labor move-
and the Watergate scandal could have contributed to the growing admiration of business
leaders. Lacking heroes in the public sector, many Americans may have looked to private
industry for role models.
5 See David E. Gumpert, Stalking the Entrepreneur, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1986,
at 32 (describing entrepreneurs as holding "a mythical status in America" and as being
symbols of individualism and drive which were "the embodiment of our romantic view of
capitalism").
356 See Hebert & Link, note 351, at 3-4 ("Academics and policymakers have responded
to waning productivity growth and increased global competition by calling for a revival of
entrepreneurship.").
357 See Surrey, Reflections, note 123, at 319-21.
358 See Hoffman, note 123, at 444-45.
359 See Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1198-202.
36 See Don Fullerton, 'The Consumption Tax: An Idea Whose ime Has Come?, 27 Tax
Notes 435, 438 (Apr. 22, 1985) (describing recent enactment of provisions compatible with
a consumption tax); see also Pechman, note 1, at 208 (noting interest in consumption tax
after World War I).
361 See Bernard Barber, Social Stratification: A Comparative Analysis of Structure and
Process 453 (1957) (describing increasing occupational mobility from 1900 to 1950); AJ.
Jaffe & R.O. Carleton, Occupational Mobility in the United States 1930-1960, at 39 (1954)
(noting increase in occupational mobility from 1930 through 1950).
362 See generally Hofstaeder, note 303.
363 See Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Move-
ment 16-41 (1962) (describing organization of the National Association of Manufacturers
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce during the progressive era); Wilson, note 129, at 153
(describing how threats of government interference led to growth of general business
associations).
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ment.364 Right wing business groups claimed the small business man-
tle.365 The conservative American Farm Bureau 366 replaced the
Grange and Populist parties as the voice of the American farmer.
3 67
Thus, the history of the public discourse casts doubt on the appeal
of redistribution as a justification for wealth taxation. One response
to this trend is to advocate redistribution through a different tax base,
usually through a progressive consumption tax,368 perhaps with higher
rates on funds spent from gifts and bequests.3 69 This approach would
not tax wealth transfers until ultimately consumed.
The history of the public discourse suggests the time is not yet ripe
for such an approach. Consumption taxes have long been unpopular
and it is uncertain how deep the new-found enthusiasm for them runs.
As the 1986 Act demonstrated, concern about wealth concentration
still can generate substantial legislative activity.370 Even assuming a
long-term drift toward consumption taxes, the demand for progressiv-
ity in such taxes seems weak. Images of wealth inspire progressivity
more than images of consumption. The rich plutocrat is more threat-
ening than the conspicuous consumer. Taxes on luxury goods have
had fleeting appeal.371
364 See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv.
L. Rev. 1111, 1121-25 (1989). The relatively radical Congress of Industrial Organizations
merged with the American Federation of Labor in 1955.
365 See Bunzel, note 301, at 61-84 (describing development of small business groups in
the 1930's); Harmon Zeigler, The Politics of Small Business 13-35 (1961) (same).
366 After 1970, the American Farm Bureau consistently testified against the estate tax.
See Discussion Draft Hearing, note 53, at 328 (statement of Am. Farm Bureau against
§ 2036(c)); Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on S. 395, S. 404, S. 574 & S. 858
Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th
Cong. 237 (1981) (statement of the Am. Farm Bureau for estate tax relief); 1976 Hearings,
note 175, at 8 (statement of the Am. Farm Bureau in favor of higher credit, widow deduc-
tion and current use valuation).
367 See generally Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (1953); Har-
mon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society (1964) (chapter entitled "Agrarian Poli-
tics: The Triumph of Formal Organization"). This change reflected increasing
concentration in American agriculture. See Richard S. Kirkendall, A History of the Family
Farm, in Is There a Moral Obligation to Save the Family Farm? 79, 96 (Gary Comstock ed.,
1987) (concluding that the family farm has become "nearly extinct"); Ingolf Vogeler, The
Myth of the Family Farm: Agribusiness Dominance of U.S. Agriculture 3 (1981) (describ-
ing fundamental transformation of agriculture).
368 See Treasury Dep't, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 122-25 (1984); William D. An-
drews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 947, 954-56 (1975) (advocating progressive consumption tax).
369 See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 2, at 350-53.
370 See McCaffery, Hybrid, note 297, at 1154 (noting the 1986 Act stepped away from
consumption and towards taxation of wealth); see generally Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Alan S.
Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of
Tax Reform (1987).
371 See generally Pechman, note 1, at 305-07, 326-27 (describing federal imposition of
excise taxes on luxury goods from early 1930s to 1965). More recent luxury taxes have
been even shorter lived. See note 137.




Like 19th century redistributional theories, benefit has recently re-
surfaced in arguments for increased wealth taxation. In 1988, Con-
gress briefly enacted a progressive income tax surcharge on senior
citizens to pay for a catastrophic health care program for them.
372
Since then, representatives have introduced bills financing long-term
health care with transfer tax increases,73 on the theory that long-term
health care benefits the decedent by preserving her assets. Academ-
ics, too, have invoked benefit. Herbert Kiesling has argued for con-
sidering public goods in taxation 74 and Marjorie Kornhauser has
defended progressive income tax rates with arguments based on
benefit.3 75
The history of tax legislation shows that benefit is critical in enact-
ing tax legislation. The belief that the government procures services
for individuals lies beneath the budgetary symbols that transcend par-
tisan divisions.376 The power of those symbols attests to the impor-
tance of benefit in the public mind. Although the concentration of
wealth and family business symbols bring estate taxation into public
awareness, larger budgetary issues generally spark enactment.377 In
this respect, the estate freeze legislation was typical. Budget bills pro-
vided the vehicle for enacting § 2036(c) and Chapter 14. Without
budgetary pressure, there would have been insufficient support for
legislation on estate freezes.
History also reveals that beliefs about benefit affect the choice
among taxes. For example, appeal to the use of tax proceeds was criti-
cal to making the income tax the dominant tax of the 20th century.
372 See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360,102 Stat. 683
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The tax was repealed one year later. See
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979.
3Z See H.R. 5393, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 2305, 100th Cong. (1988); see also H.R. 1200,
103th Cong. (1993); S. 491, 103th Cong. (1993).
374 See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 201-07.
375 See Kornhauser, Rhetoric, note 267, at 491-97.
376 See Witte, Politics, note 70, at 265 (stating most partisan votes occur prior to ultimate
enactment; final votes on tax bills invariably provide wide margins); see also James M.
Verdier, The President, Congress, and Tax Reform: Patterns Over Three Decades, Annals
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., Sept. 1988, at 114,123 (noting that "Congress's ability to play a
leadership role in tax reform is greatest when economic forces help push the issue onto the
agenda" and that "[tihe prospect of partisan political advantage may help stimulate con-
gressional leadership, but it is not crucial.").
377 Estate tax increases most often are driven by revenue demands. See Eisenstein, note
282, at 237 (concluding that from 1916 to 1942 the estate tax primarily was imposed for
revenue). Conversely, tax cuts provide the occasion for erosion of the tax. See generally
Witte, Politics, note 70, at 93-95 (describing repeal of gift tax as part of general tax reduc-
tion in 1924), 218-19 (describing repeal of carryover basis as part of larger tax reductions);
Gutman, Reforming, note 2, at 1202-06 (describing transfer tax cuts pursuant to overall
reductions in 1981).
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Prior to 1940, the income tax, like the estate tax, was confined to a
small class.378 During World War II, Treasury shifted its defense of
the tax from reducing concentrations of wealth to paying for democ-
racy 379 and the income tax became "a people's tax. ' 380 Although the
war ended, the need to preserve democracy did not. The income tax
became the price of living in a free society.381
The history of tax legislation reveals that benefit arguments draw
upon two distinct cognitive models. The first is the life threatening
emergency. Politicians appeal to personal crises requiring urgent mo-
bilization of resources to obtain support for legislation.382 Accord-
ingly, tax increases generally occur in dire situations, most often
war.38 3 Crisis provides an overriding384 but fleeting basis for action.
With safety comes tax cuts.38 5
More consistent support is provided by the second model underly-
ing benefit, that of the everyday consumer purchase. Consumers ex-
change money for goods and services, and sometimes view tax
payments as doing the same.3 86 The consumer purchase model is most
prominent in the social security payroll tax. The only tax to experi-
ence sustained peacetime growth,387 the payroll tax has done so
378 See 79 Cong. Rec. 3394 (1935) (describing people subject to income tax as "overfed
and underworked millionaires") (statement of Rep. Charles Truax); Leff, note 339, at 2-5
(describing prewar income tax as a symbolic tax "designed more to quell abuses than to
shift income with the rest of society").
379 See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Ex-
pansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 685 (1988).
380 Revenue Act of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
77th Cong. 3 (1942) (statement of Treas. Sec'y Henry Morgenthau, Jr.). The percentage of
workers filing income tax returns increased from 15% to 90%. See Witte, Politics, note 70,
at 126.
381 See Witte, Politics, note 70, at 137 (attributing failure to cut taxes after World War II
to changed role of government, its responsibility for well-being of its citizens and need to
maintain high defense expenditures).
382 Hence the appeal to war to rally support for social programs, from the war on pov-
erty to the war on crime. See Elder & Cobb, note 164 at 76, 79.
383 See Hansen, note 130, at 65 (explaining level of taxation by reference to "war"
model; "revenue amounts certainly increased during the major wars in our history"); Witte,
Politics, note 70, at 248-49 (noting that tax increases occur almost exclusively in response to
war). The only peacetime increase, that of 1932, was a response to a different emergency,
the Great Depression. See id. at 96 (quoting Treasury Secretary as generally supporting
low taxes but acknowledging that "these are not normal times").
384 See Bartlett, note 254, at 564 ("All's fair in love and war.") (quoting Francis Edward
Smedley).
385 See Witte, Politics, note 70, at 248-49 (describing bias towards peacetime tax
reduction).
386 Some view the purchase itself as a normative goal. See Gordon, note 248, at 90-94
(describing fair exchange as a criterion for justice).
387 See Graetz, Praise, note 2, at 265-67 (describing growth of employment taxes from
15% to 35% of federal revenues during the period from 1959 to 1983); Michael J. Graetz &
Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation, Principles and Policies 16-17 (1995)
(describing growth from 1981 to 1994 from 30% to 35%).
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largely because social security is perceived as insurance, comparable
to private programs.3n
Appeal to the consumer purchase model seems necessary if a tax is
to sustain peacetime support. The income tax remained a mass tax
after World War II because it was perceived as more than an emer-
gency measure. Treasury deliberately analogized the tax to a con-
sumer purchase 389 and emphasized its routine nature.390
So far, the estate tax has drawn only upon the emergency model.
Crisis, usually war,391 has precipitated most inheritance taxation. Ten-
sions with France resulted in a stamp tax on legacies from 1797 to
1802;392 the Civil War gave rise to legacy, stamp and succession taxes
from 1864-1870;393 and the Spanish-American War prompted an in-
heritance tax from 1898 to 1901. 394 Efforts to pass the current estate
tax did not succeed until the advent of World War I,395 and major
increases occurred again during World War H.396 Crisis, however, has
M See Leff, note 339, at 45-46 (noting payroll tax viewed as an insurance premium, not
a penalty). Social security taxes, however, have not kept up with benefits. See John F.
Witte, The Revenue Foundations of Modem Government: Federal Tax Policy from 1932 to
1964, at 26 (Project on the Federal Social Role working Paper 1985) [hereinafter
Foundations]:
It would seem logical that both citizens and politicians would be more willing
to increase Social Security taxes than income taxes simply because it is known
how the money will be spent, but such has hardly been the case. Payroll taxes
have increased-but the increases have been delayed consistently, have been
enacted reluctantly, tend to lag behind benefit increases, and have an actuarial
value much lower than benefits paid out.
3S9 See Jones, note 379, at 723-24 ("The concept of a consumer war, of buying weapons
and, ultimately, victory, seemed to be quite popular with government propagandists ....
To the average American, war was portrayed as a market transaction with enormous con-
sequences-a mundane means of defeating a mortal enemy.").
390 See id. at 728-32 (describing propaganda designed to portray paying taxes as a sim-
ple, routine burden of citizenship).
391 Estate tax increases in response to revenue shortfalls resulting from the Great De-
pression also seems to draw upon the emergency modeL See Eisenstein, note 282, at 235
(describing effect of the Great Depression on the 1932 Act).
392 See Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1,1 Stat. 527 (made effective on July 1, 1798 by Act
of Dec. 15, 1797, cl. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 536).
393 See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 475, 483, 485-87.
394 See Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. 448, 464-66.
395 See Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 900, 40 Stat. 300, 324; Act of March 3, 1917, ch.
159, §§ 201-07,300,39 Stat. 1000-02; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201,39 Stat. 756,777.
Congress rejected death taxes in 1909 and 1913. See Eisenstein, note 282, at 229.
39 See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 401-415, 451-58, 56 Stat. 798, 941-54; Revenue
Act of 1941, ch. 412, §§ 401,402,55 Stat. 687,704-06; Revenue Act of 1940, ch. 419, §§ 206,
207, 54 Stat. 516, 521-22.
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not generated continuing support.397 With peace comes estate tax cuts
and a return to the legislative stalemate borne of divisive symbols. 398
The history of tax legislation suggests that a critical issue for wealth
taxation is whether it can draw upon the consumer purchase model.
Most theorists dismiss benefit theory because they find it difficult to
allocate the benefit of governmental expenditures and because they
fear the distributional consequences.3 99 Recent scholarship casts
doubt on both concerns. Pragmatism raises its own measurement
problems,40° and depending on the allocation of government services,
benefit theory can support progressive taxation.
401
Study of the public discourse complements this scholarship by deep-
ening one's understanding of benefit. The consumer purchase model
suggests the importance of linking taxes to expenditures. One way of
linking a tax is by "earmarking" it, that is, designating its proceeds for
specific uses.4a Mere designation, however, does not assure popular
acceptance. Efforts to label the catastrophic health insurance
surcharge a "premium" failed.403 The fate of that legislation suggests
the importance of matching payment with receipt of benefit.40 4 It also
397 See 1925 Hearings, note 173, at 426 (statement of F.W. Denio, Am. Bankers Ass'n)
(arguing that the estate tax is only appropriate in emergencies such as war); Mellon, note
173, at 124 ("The Federal Government should keep estate taxes as a reserve in times of
national stress.").
398 See notes 350, 370. Progressive income tax rates show the same pattern. See Witte,
Foundations, note 388, at 35 ("Whatever progressivity is built into the income tax system
was introduced during wars and financial crises. In normal times there has been a constant
pressure to lower taxes and to remove progressivity...").
399 See Groves, supra note 286, at 29 (noting that poor probably benefit more from the
government).
40 Pragmatists assume away difficult empirical issues. In asserting that the comprehen-
sive tax base places economic decisions on equal footing, pragmatists assume that all be-
havior has equal elasticities, and in equating the comprehensive base with basic fairness,
they assume that all persons value money equally. These assumptions have been chal-
lenged. See Witte, Politics, note 70, at 54 ("The proposition that all income adds equally to
the exercise of market choices seems wholly untenable."); Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax
Norms" be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal
Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1115, 1152.
401 See Kiesling, Public Goods, note 17, at 202:
The received doctrine among economists seems to be that the benefit principle
cannot be applied to public goods that are redistributive in nature. This is
surely erroneous. Redistributive public goods, such as welfare payments to the
poor, have public good benefits also, or they would not have been enacted into
law.
4m See Pechman, note 1, at 306 (describing earmarking as a major excise tax innovation,
beginning in 1956 with the Highway Trust Fund).
40 See David P. Fan & Lois Norem, The Media and the Fate of the Medicare Cata-
strophic Extension Act, 17 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 39, 51 (1992) (noting that shift in
rhetoric used to describe financing from "premiums" paid by beneficiaries to "taxes" paid
to support the program).
404 See Joseph C. Morreale, The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988: Issues
of Equity in a Policy Reversal, 7 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 117, 142 (1991) ("Congress
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suggests that the payor must identify with the beneficiary. Believing
that they one day will benefit from social security, the young acqui-
esce in social security taxes. o5 Those who already possessed cata-
strophic coverage rebelled at the income tax surcharge.406
The consumer purchase model has implications for general revenue
taxes as well. Tax theorists generally assume that, liquidity constraints
aside, taxpayers are indifferent between taxes of equal present
value.4°7 The consumer purchase model denies this assumption. That
model persuades by portraying taxes as one more every day expendi-
ture. Thus, it suggests a preference for paying taxes in small gradual
increments rather than in one large lump sum. This preference is not
necessarily irrational.4  More easily anticipated, small taxes do not
produce large swings in standards of living.
This factor suggests that benefit arguments fit annual taxes4  better
than "lumpy" ones. 410 The lumpiness of wealth taxes can be reduced
through withholding mechanisms, gift taxes and annual wealth
taxes. 41' For estate freezes, aversion to lumpiness suggests a prefer-
ence for Chapter 14 over § 2036(c), even if the latter taxed the same
present value and accommodated liquidity constraints.
... made a severe political blunder by front-loading the increased cost of the [Catastrophic
Health Insurance] program.... Congress raised the premiums... much faster, and much
sooner, than the actual receipt of benefits by the elderly.").
40 See Paul F. Harstad, Interpreting Americans' Attitudes Toward Taxes, 13 Tax Notes
1083, 1096 (Nov. 9, 1981) ("The reasons for [the] unique acceptance [of the social security
tax] are fairly obvious.... Taxpayers perceive a direct link between social security taxes
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Tax theorists view the legislative process principally as a constraint
on their craft. Legislation contrary to current analysis is attributed to
power politics, devoid of policy content. This Article argues that legis-
lation involves more than policy and politics. There is also a cultural
dimension, reflected in the public discourse, the language used to jus-
tify legislation to the public at large. As the estate freeze legislation
demonstrates, the public discourse comprises the terrain in which
other perspectives operate. It sheds light on legislative action and
why certain issues receive attention.
The popular symbols and stories of the public discourse dominate
democratic discussion. To participate in that discussion, theorists must
uncover the values beneath those archetypes and translate them into
policy norms. The power of the family business symbol suggests that
theorists should give more attention to norms based on reward and
community. The history of the archetypes in legislation suggests that
pragmatic policy analysis has limited appeal for inheritance taxation.
Theorists would do well to explore a benefit analysis that took seri-
ously popular understandings equating tax payments with consumer
purchases.
This Article has far reaching implications. The project of translat-
ing popular understandings into policy goals extends well beyond the
taxation of wealth. Although unfamiliar, this project promises to
make tax theory more relevant.
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